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Downgrading Rating Agency Reform

Jeffrey Manns*
Abstract: The Dodd-Frank Act promised to usher in sweeping changes to overhaul the
rating agency industry whose shortcomings helped to pave the way to the financial crisis.
But two years after the Act’s passage, hopes have given way to disappointment. The
most important challenges of how to enhance rating agency competition, accuracy, and
accountability remain largely open questions. The Securities & Exchange Commission
(SEC) has made progress in heightening rating agency oversight and addressing the most
egregious abuses that fueled the financial crisis. But rating agency reforms have fallen
far short of their potential due to the Act’s competing objectives to marginalize ratings, to
expose rating agencies to greater sunlight and private liability exposure, and to treat
rating agencies as a regulated industry. The most important part of the Act remains the
most unresolved: the SEC’s mandate to design an alternative for the issuer-pays system
that addresses the conflicts of interest created by debt issuers selecting their rating agency
gatekeepers. Prospects for an independent commission to select rating agencies for
structured finance products have foundered due to the challenges of crafting benchmarks
for rating agency performance to use in selecting rating agencies and holding them
accountable. The danger is that any standard chosen for rating agencies could fuel
herding effects as rating agencies may shape their methodologies to game the system,
rather than to enhance accurate and timely assessments of credit risk. Given the
difficulties in resolving this issue, this Article suggests that policymakers should consider
alternative ways to enhance competition such as by using regulatory incentives to break
up the leading rating agencies, so that smaller rating agencies can more plausibly
compete. Additionally, it suggests the potential for expanding the scope of private
enforcement opportunities to leverage the self-interest of issuers to prosecute grossly
negligent conduct by rating agencies. This approach would complement the SEC’s
ongoing efforts to foster greater competition and accountability.
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I. Introduction
Rating agency reform was once heralded as “[t]he strongest piece of [the] DoddFrank” Act.1 But the results have fallen short of these high hopes. The questions of how
to enhance rating agency competition, accuracy, and accountability remain largely
unresolved.2 Reforms were designed to remedy systematically lax assessments of credit
risk by the three leading rating agencies that legitimized trillions of dollars of assetbacked securities of dubious value.3 The Dodd-Frank Act promised to remedy rating
agencies’ shortcomings by simultaneously deemphasizing reliance on ratings as proxies
for credit risk, enhancing disclosures and subjecting rating agencies to private liability
exposure, and imposing greater public oversight and restrictions on rating agencies.4

1

See John Lippert, Credit Ratings Can't Claim Free Speech in Law Giving New Risks,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 8, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-08/credit-ratings-can-tclaim-free-speech-in-law-bringing-risks-to-companies.html (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
derivatives expert Frank Partnoy).
2
See, e.g., Andrew Ackerman, SEC Gives Up on Web Schedules for Dodd-Frank Rules, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 17, 2004, 4:55 PM), http://blogs. wsj.com/economics/2012/09/17/sec-gives-up-web-schedules-fordodd-frank-rules/ (noting that the SEC has “conced[ed] that it has no idea when it will finish the” required
Dodd=Frank rulemakings).
3
Write-downs and credit losses from the subprime mortgage crisis alone amounted to upwards of
$1 trillion. Compare Jody Shenn & David Mildenberg, Subprime, CDO Bank Losses May Exceed $265
(Jan.
31,
2008,
3:46
PM),
Billion,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aeOWjjdmu2pU (noting S&P’s estimates
that losses will exceed $265 billion), with Jody Shenn, Fed Slashes Subprime, Alt-A Mortgage Payment
(Mar.
25,
2008,
4:51
PM),
S&P
Says,
BLOOMBERG
Shocks,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=asN4m0P5mLm4 (noting that losses related
to collateralized debt obligations may top $460 billion); Yalman Onaran, Banks' Subprime Losses Top $500
(Aug.
12,
2008,
4:07
PM),
Billion
on
Writedowns,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a8sW0n1Cs1tY (discussing $500 billion in
existing writedowns and credit losses from the subprime crisis and over $1 trillion in likely losses).
4
See, e.g., STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL
COLLAPSE: MAJORITY AND MINORITY STAFF REPORT 315-16 (2011) [hereinafter WALL STREET AND THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS]. Each of these legislative approaches responded to the three main schools of thought on
reform. The “abolitionist” camp called for removing government requirements for ratings to marginalize
the significance of ratings. See, e.g., Mark J. Flannery, Joel F. Houston & Frank Partnoy, Credit Default
Swap Spreads as Viable Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2086-89 (2010) (arguing
for a shift to reliance on credit default swap spreads to serve as a proxy of creditworthiness); Jonathan R.
Macey, The Politicization of American Corporate Governance, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 10, 21-24 (2006)
(arguing that credit ratings provide “no information of value to the investing public”); Frank Partnoy,
Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis 1-2 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-015, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1430653 (advocating the abolition of governmentmandated requirements for rating because “[a] primary cause of the recent credit market turmoil was
overdependence on credit ratings and credit rating agencies”). Conventional “passive” securities advocates
sought to strengthen competition and private accountability through greater transparency and disclosure
coupled with private causes of action. See, e.g., Kia Dennis, The Ratings Game: Explaining Rating Agency
Failures in the Build Up to the Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1144-50 (2009) (arguing for
greater rating agency disclosures and expanded SEC disciplinary and sanctions power). “Regulated
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The Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) has made progress in heightening
oversight of the rating agency industry and in addressing the most egregious abuses that
fueled the financial crisis.5 But faith in regulators’ potential to overhaul the rating agency
industry appears just as inflated as the ratings for asset-backed securities that
policymakers have decried. A downgrade of the impact of rating agency reform is
overdue. A myriad of legislative and regulatory changes have failed to address the
underlying challenges of fostering competition and ensuring timely and accurate
assessments of credit risks.6
Rating agencies understandably faced a firestorm of blame for their role in fueling
the financial crisis. Rating agencies not only failed to identify credit risks but also
legitimized reckless risk taking through inflated ratings.7 Their failures were on such a
large scale and so comprehensive that Congress could not ignore calls for action.8 But
unfortunately, rating agency reform represents a classic case of the Washington way of
“addressing” problems. Politicians embraced a hodgepodge of broad and contradictory
reforms in the hope that some combination of approaches would solve the problems, or at
minimum absolve politicians from blame.9 In the face of Dodd-Frank’s competing

industry” advocates called for greater government intervention in the selection of rating agencies to address
market failure combined with more rigorous public oversight and regulation. See, e.g., Lynn Bai, The
Performance Disclosures of Credit Rating Agencies: Are They Effective Reputational Sanctions?, 7 N.Y.U.
J.L. & BUS. 47, 97-98 (2010) (arguing for the need for standardization of rating agency performance
statistics to facilitate comparability); Jonathan M. Barnett, Intermediaries Revisited: Is Efficient
Certification Consistent with Profit Maximization?, 37 J. CORP. L. 475, 501-02 (2012) (arguing in favor of
greater regulatory oversight as preferable to potentially counter-productive efforts at fostering greater
competition); John C. Coffee, Jr., Ratings Reform: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
231, 233-36 (2011) (advocating the abolition of the issuer-pays system and analyzing the merits of the
potential alternatives for heightened public regulation); Yair Listokin & Benjamin Taibleson, Essay, If You
Misrate, Then You Lose: Improving Credit Rating Accuracy Through Incentive Compensation, 27 YALE J.
ON REG. 91, 94-95 (2010) (arguing that mandating that compensating rating agencies with the debt
proceeds they rate would create greater incentives for rating accuracy); Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After
the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011, 1015-19 (2009) (calling for a user fee on investors to
finance the creation of an independent board to select and compensate rating agencies based on a
competitive bidding process); Milosz Gudzowski, Note, Mortgage Credit Ratings and the Financial Crisis:
The Need for a State-Run Mortgage Security Credit Rating Agency, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 245, 26471 (advocating a government utility model for ratings).
5
See, e.g., Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml.
6
See, e.g., infra notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
7
See, e.g., infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
8
See, e.g., Joseph R. Mason & Joshua Rosner, Where Did the Risk Go? How Misapplied Bond
Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligation Market Disruptions 34-47
(2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027475 (discussing the shortcomings of ratings in failing to
reflect the risks of subprime debt instruments); David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating
Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
985, 988-91 (2006) (discussing how rating agencies’ lax approach fueled abuses in the subprime mortgage
market).
9
See, e.g., Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 57-58 (1982) (arguing that Congress exploits the ability to delegate
difficult decisions to administrative agencies to avoid direct accountability); DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN
O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING

4

objectives, the Act failed to resolve the basic questions of how to create meaningful
competition in an oligopolistic industry and how to incentivize accurate and timely
ratings. Congress sidestepped directly addressing these difficult questions, leaving the
SEC with the unenviable task of providing some degree of coherence to Congress’s
spectrum of solutions.10 After two years of regulatory action to implement the DoddFrank Act, as many questions as answers remain about the impact of reforms.
The most important part of the Act remains the most unresolved: the SEC’s
mandate to design an alternative rating industry business model to address the conflicts of
interest created by debt issuers’ selecting and paying their rating agency gatekeepers.11
Prospects for the creation of an independent commission to select rating agencies for
structured finance products have foundered due to the challenges of crafting benchmarks
for rating agency performance to use in selecting rating agencies and holding them
accountable.12 The use of any performance-based standard to select or evaluate rating
agencies risks fueling herding effects as rating agencies may shape their methodologies to
game the system rather than to enhance accurate and timely assessments of credit risk.13
Given the intrinsic challenges of establishing performance-based standards for
ratings, this Article suggests that policymakers should consider alternative ways to
enhance competition, such as use of regulatory incentives to break up the leading rating
agencies or segmenting the rating agency market so that smaller rating agencies can more
plausibly compete. Additionally, policymakers should consider expanding the scope of
private enforcement opportunities to leverage the self-interest of issuers to monitor and
prosecute grossly negligent conduct by rating agencies. This approach would
complement the SEC’s ongoing efforts to foster greater competition and accountability in
the ratings industry.
II. The Role of Rating Agencies in the Financial Crisis
A broad consensus exists that rating agencies played a central role in the financial
crisis and that remedying the shortcomings of rating agencies is key to preventing future
crises.14 Many actors deserve blame for fueling excessive risk taking through the design
UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 32-33 (1999) (observing that Congressional delegation to administrative
agencies serves as a blame-shifting device).
10
See infra Part III.A.
11
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§
939D-F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1888-90 (2010).
12
See infra Part IV.A.
13
See infra Part IV.A.
14
Numerous empirical studies documented the failures of rating agencies. See, e.g., Efraim
Benmelech & Jennifer Dlugosz, The Alchemy of CDO Credit Ratings, 56 J. MONETARY ECON. 617, 624-28,
632-33 (criticizing the lax process for credit rating of CDOs and the conflicts of interest created by the
hiring of rating agencies by issuers); Jennifer E. Bethel, Allen Ferrell & Gang Hu, Law and Economic
Issues in Subprime Litigation 16-18, 21, 74 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus. Discussion
Paper No. 612, 2008) (documenting the stability of ratings in spite of marked decline in the extent of
diligence into and quality of the underlying mortgages in mortgage-backed securities from 2001 to 2006);
Adam Ashcraft, Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham & James Vickery, MBS Ratings and the Mortgage Credit Boom
23-24, tbl. 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report No. 449, 2010) (documenting a similar pattern
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of trillions of dollars of structured finance products that intentionally camouflaged
substantial risks.15 But rating agencies merit particular blame because a myriad of federal
and state statutes and regulations deputize rating agencies as gatekeepers of credit risk.16
Not only did rating agencies fail to raise red flags about rising risks, but they also
legitimized the proliferation of deceptive financial instruments through issuing inflated
ratings.17 Interconnections of interest between rating agencies and their client debt
issuers, and an absence of accountability, led rating agencies to abrogate their
responsibilities as screeners of credit risk.18 As a result, rating agencies failed to identify
growing risks or to condition ratings on adequate diligence and disclosures by issuers.19
of stability in high ratings in spite of declines in diligence of and asset quality in mortgage-backed
securities from 2001 to 2008).
15
Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) and Mortgage-Based Collateralized Debt
Obligations (CDOs) are debt obligations based on large pools of mortgage loans whose cash flows derive
from principal and interest payments from the underlying mortgages. See Mortgage-Backed Securities,
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 23, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm; Maureen
Farrell,
Risky
Loans
are
Back,
CNNMoney
(Sept.
26,
2012,
5:48
AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/09/26/investing/risky-loans-clo/. Approximately $1.7 trillion in subprime
RMBS were issued from 2001 to 2006. See Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understanding the
Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report No. 318,
2008). The dollar values of subprime CDOs are harder to pinpoint because of less transparency, but JP
Morgan has estimated that $500 to $600 billion in subprime CDOs were issued over this period. See Jenny
Anderson & Heather Timmons, Why a U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis Is Felt Around the World, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, at C1; see also Michael G. Crouhy, Robert A. Jarrow & Stuart M. Turnbull, The
Subprime Credit Crisis of 07 8-19 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1112467 (discussing the
array of market participants who have potential culpability for the subprime mortgage crisis).
16
See, e.g., Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, sec. 4, § 15E, 120
Stat. 1327, 1329-33 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 780-7) (laying out the process for rating agencies to be
certified as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (“NRSROs”)); Regulation S-K, 17
C.F.R. § 229.10(c) (2008) (mandating the inclusion of ongoing NRSRO ratings for issuers making filings
under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); see also Rating Agencies and
the Use of Credit Ratings Under the Federal Securities Laws, 68 Fed. Reg. 35,258, 35,258 (June 12, 2003)
[hereinafter SEC Concept Release] (discussing how since 1975 the SEC “has relied on credit ratings from
market-recognized credible rating agencies for distinguishing among grades of creditworthiness in various
regulations under the Federal securities laws”); Selected Principles for the Regulation of Investments by
Insurance Companies and Pension Funds, 75 FIN. MARKET TRENDS 117, 119-20 (2000) (recommending
ratings requirements for insurers and pension funds to purchase debt securities).
17
See, e.g., Bethel, Ferrell & Hu, supra note 14, at 37-60 (discussing the legal issues surrounding
the extensive subprime litigation, such as Rule 10b-5 actions against banks, ERISA litigation, and litigation
against rating agencies); cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1408–09 (2002) (arguing “the collective failure of the gatekeepers” lay at the
heart of the accounting scandals); Hillary A. Sale, Gatekeepers, Disclosure, and Issuer Choice, 81 WASH.
U. L.Q. 403, 403–08 (2003) (arguing that securities gatekeepers fail the public by not adequately screening
for corporate wrongdoing).
18
See, e.g., FRANK PARTNOY, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65, 74-78 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002) (emphasizing the
government’s role in making rating agencies central actors in the securities industry and arguing that rating
agencies do not serve as effective gatekeepers of credit risk); Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your
Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus
Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 342-43 (2003) (attributing the failure of rating agencies as
gatekeepers to their reluctance to downgrade their issuer clients because of concerns about the far-reaching
effects downgrades can have); Mason & Rosner, supra note 8, at 15-19, 34-47 (discussing the
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During the financial crisis the quality of credit underpinning structured finance
products steadily eroded, yet issuers continued to receive high ratings.20 Ratings inflation
was subtle in that ratings did not go up in general, but the risks rose for the underlying
portfolios without resulting in lower initial ratings or downgrades.21 Opportunistic
issuers took advantage of lax ratings to push the envelope in lowering the quality of the
underlying portfolios of asset-backed securities, because they could externalize the risks
to third party purchasers.22 Because rating agencies do not have an affirmative duty to
verify the quality of the underlying portfolios, they lacked the incentive to push back
when issuers reduced independent due diligence of their portfolios.23

shortcomings of ratings in failing to reflect the risks of subprime debt instruments); Reiss, supra note 8, at
988-91, 1022-23 (discussing how rating agencies’ lax approach fueled abuses of the subprime mortgage
market). But see Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 50-52, 82-93
(2004) (advocating reduced barriers to entry to encourage new entrants into the ratings industry and arguing
against greater government oversight of rating agencies); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public
Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 12-20 (arguing that additional regulation of
rating agencies by the SEC is unnecessary and probably inefficient because it poses risks of political
manipulation).
19
See Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 15, at 7, 11-12. A broad literature has explored
enlisting private gatekeepers to perform public enforcement functions. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301,
308–09 (2004) (describing a gatekeeper as a “reputational intermediary” who “receives only a limited
payoff from any involvement in misconduct” compared to the primary wrongdoer); Assaf Hamdani,
Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 63 (2003) (defining gatekeepers as parties who “offer a service
or sell a product that is necessary for clients wishing to enter a particular market or engage in certain
activities”); Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulation
of Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1050–54 (1993) (describing gatekeepers as actors who
provide “indispensable, or at least extremely useful,” services to the targeted wrongdoers, have similar
monitoring capacities, and who cannot easily be replaced by wrongdoers); Reinier H. Kraakman,
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986)
(defining gatekeepers as “private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their
cooperation from wrongdoers”). This article understands gatekeepers as private actors whose role as
suppliers or consumers of lawful goods or services provides them with the cost-effective ability to detect
and potentially prevent wrongdoing.
20
Greed appears to have underpinned the decreased reliance on third party due diligence. See
Vikas Bajaj & Jenny Anderson, Inquiry Focuses on Withholding of Data on Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2008, at A1. Review of each underlying mortgage costs about $350, and issuers of collateralized debt
obligations likely did not want to cut into their profit margins, and were content to cast a blind eye, while
shifting the risk to debt purchasers. See id.
21
See Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime
Loans, 125 Q.J. ECON. 307, 330-37 (2010) (pointing to empirical evidence that securitized mortgage
portfolios were 20% more likely to default than comparable non-securitized portfolios).
22
See Keys et. al., supra note 21, at 318; see, e.g., Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham & Pickery, supra
note 14, at 52 tbl. 3 (documenting how low/no document subprime mortgages rose from 24.8% in 2001 to a
height of 46% in 2006, and interest-only subprime mortgage loans rose from 0% in 2001 to 28% in 2005,
while the percentage of triple A mortgages only declined from 90% to 80% during this period); Bethel,
Ferrell, & Hu, supra note 14, at 74 (documenting how the low/no document share of subprime mortgages
in mortgage-backed securities rose from 28.5% in 2001 to 50.8% in 2006, and how interest-only mortgages
grew from 0% in 2001 to a height of 37.8% in 2005).
23
See Bajaj & Anderson, supra note 20, at A1 (noting that investment banks decreased use of
third party due diligence of the underlying assets of asset-backed securities portfolios, and rating agencies
did not push back); Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 15, at 11-12.
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Rating agencies also deserve blame for affirmatively creating systematically lax
ratings. For example, rating agencies primarily relied on mathematical models that used
historical data to estimate the loss distribution and to simulate the cash flows of
collateralized debt obligations.24 Rating agencies’ methodologies over-weighted initial
expectations of loss in estimating the projected lifetime expectations of loss of debt
instruments.25 Flawed and overly-optimistic assumptions fueled a system of lax ratings
which failed to anticipate or reflect the housing market downturn.26 To make matters
worse, rating agencies made their models for collateralized debt obligations transparent,
which ironically allowed issuers to game the system by subordinating only the minimum
amount of tranches to the senior tranche to still secure AAA ratings.27 Most troubling,
rating agencies made discretionary adjustments from their own models to overstate the
degree of cushion of the senior tranches of collateralized debt obligations in order to
guarantee AAA ratings.28 Rating agencies appeared reluctant to downgrade debt for fear
of biting the issuer hands that feed.29
The shortcomings of rating agencies raise the question of how their power arose.
Historically, rating agencies started off as subscription businesses that bridged an
information gap between debt issuers and existing and prospective creditors.30
Prospective debt purchasers paid for rating agencies to assess new debt issues and to
24

See Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 15, at 40-43.
See Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 15, at 56-59.
26
See Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 15, at 55-60; see also Mark Whitehouse, Slices of Risk:
How a Formula Ignited a Market that Burned Some Big Investors,” WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2005, at A1
(discussing how the rating agencies’ assumptions concerning risk led to widespread reliance on erroneous
ratings for collateralized debt obligations).
27
See PRAGYAN DEB & GARETH MURPHY, LONDON SCH. OF ECON., CREDIT RATING AGENCIES:
ALTERNATIVE
MODEL
9
(2009),
available
at
AN
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/debp/Papers/Ratings_Regulation.pdf.
28
See, e.g., Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham & Pickery, supra note 14, at 2-5, 52 tbl. 3 (analyzing
90% of the mortgage-backed securities issued from 2001 to 2007 and documenting the rapid decline of
risk-adjusted subordination from 2005 to 2007 at the height of investor speculation in mortgage-backed
securities); John M. Griffin & Dragon Yongjun Tang, Did Subjectivity Play a Role in CDO Credit
Ratings?, 67 J. FIN. 1293, 1295, 1300, 1309, 1325-26 (2012) (documenting how, in a study of over 900
CDOs from 1997 to 2007, rating agencies systematically made discretionary adjustments, almost 85% of
which were upwards and overstated the extent of the AAA tranches); see also Richard Stanton & Nancy
Wallace, CMBS Subordination, Ratings Inflation, and the Crisis of 2007-2009 2-3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 16206), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1648006 (documenting how,
even though the underlying commercial real estate collateral did not decline, the risk-adjusted
subordination declined in the CMBS market until senior tranches had insufficient protection).
29
See Andre Güttler, Lead-Lag Relationships and Rating Convergence Among Credit Rating
Agencies 1-3, 12-15 (European Bus. Sch. Research Paper, Series 09-14, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1488164 (documenting herding effects among the two leading rating agencies for
upgrades but not downgrades).
30
See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate
Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1110 (1995) (discussing the role of rating agencies and other
securities intermediaries in reducing risk by distilling ambiguous information into clearer signals for
markets); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA.
L. REV. 549, 613-21 (1984) (discussing the gatekeeping roles of securities intermediaries). Currently, only
one rating agency, Egan Jones, functions exclusively as a subscriber-paid rating agency. See William D.
Cohan, SEC Sues the One Rating Agency Not on the SEC’s Take, Bloomberg, Sept. 30, 2012, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-30/sec-sues-the-one-rating-firm-not-on-wall-street-s-take.html.
25
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provide updates on the creditworthiness of existing debt.31 The federal government first
co-opted ratings as proxies of credit value in the 1930s by requiring banks to hold
reserves that met a rating threshold.32 But the biggest shift in the industry began in the
1970s when a host of treaties, federal statutes, and regulations began to require a broad
range of actors, such as money market funds, banks, and regulators, to refer to ratings,
effectively making ratings a public good.33
United States government requirements for ratings had two significant impacts.
First, government requirements for ratings entrenched an oligopoly of rating agencies.
The leading rating agencies - Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and to a lesser extent Fitch had already accounted for the overwhelming majority of the ratings market prior to the
1970s.34 But the government then reinforced barriers to entry by officially recognizing
only the established players as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
(“NRSROs”).35 NRSRO status largely served as a virtual tautology of market
dominance. The SEC’s “single most important criterion” in awarding NRSRO status was
“that the rating agency is widely accepted in the U.S. as an issuer of credible and reliable
ratings by the predominant users of securities ratings.”36 If the SEC would not recognize
an agency as a NRSRO unless it was “widely accepted,” in practice only the established
leading firms could achieve this status.
2006 legislation partially opened the gates for new entrants by introducing a more
open NRSRO certification process, which may foster greater rating agency competition
in the long run.37 But the 2006 legislation did not address the entrenched dominance of
the leading rating agencies. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 went further by formally
abolishing most requirements for ratings in government statutes and regulations.38 But
by 2010, the damage was arguably done as the market’s systematic reliance on rating
agencies entrenched their market power.39 The rating agency industry continues to

31

See Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Law and Economics of
Regulating Ratings Firms, 3 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 49, 76-77 (2007) (providing an overview of the
historical development of subscription-based rating agencies).
32
See Gregory Karp, Ratings Game: Power of S&P, Other Top Credit Agencies, Grew from
Government Action, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 14, 2011, at 1.
33
See SEC Concept Release, supra note 16, at 2; Karp, supra note 32, at 1.
34
See Reiss, supra note 8, at 1017-21 (discussing the oligopolistic nature of the rating agency
market).
35
See SEC Concept Release, supra note 16, at 35259.
36
NRSRO status was previously achieved in practice through the SEC’s no-action letter process.
See SEC Concept Release, supra note 16, at 35258, 35260.
37
See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327, 1327-1339
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 780-7).
38
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§939A, 124 Stat. 1376, 1887 (2010).
39
See Dave Clarke, Regulators Propose Credit Rating Alternatives, REUTERS, Dec. 7, 2011. For a
contrary view that solely emphasizes the significance of regulatory barriers to entry, see Frank Partnoy, The
Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U.
L.Q. 619, 681-82 (1999) (arguing that “credit ratings are valuable, not because they contain valuable
information but because they grant issuers ‘regulatory licenses.’ . . . [O]nce regulation is passed that
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consist of three giant whales and a handful of minnows of small competitors with
marginal market share and modest impact.40
The power of the rating agency oligopoly is magnified by the fact that debt issuers
routinely seek to have two ratings from among the three leading rating agencies.41 As a
result, little competition exists in the rating agency industry.42 Because the “big three”
are viewed as the “gold standard” for the industry, markets would likely be wary of firms
that lack ratings from the leading firms.43
Second, the fact that government requirements made ratings a de facto public
good facilitated an industry shift from a subscription model to a “user pays” model. Debt
issuers had the incentive to select and pay rating agencies to assess their securities in
order to ensure access to markets subject to government rating requirements.44
Government policies inadvertently created a symbiotic relationship between rating
agencies and their issuer clients “that may compromise [the] objectivity” of the
agencies.45
Having a debt issuer select and pay the assessor of its credit risk is akin to having
the fox pay the guard of the henhouse. This conflict of interest was particularly
problematic in the context of asset-backed securities. Bank issuers used these vehicles to
sell off all of their risk exposure in mortgages to third parties,46 while rating agencies
profited handsomely from legitimizing this growing market.47 At minimum, this
incorporates ratings, rating agencies begin to sell not only information but also the valuable property rights
associated with compliance with that regulation.”).
40
See S. REP. NO. 109-326, at 3-5 (2006). It is important to stress that the modest impact the
smaller rating agencies make is still important. For example, Kroll and Morningstar have made progress in
gaining market share in rating commercial mortgage-backed securities (“CMBS”) in the wake of Standard
& Poor’s debacle of pulling a preliminary rating on a $1.5 billion Goldman Sachs CMBS in 2011 and
temporarily pulling back from that market. See Al Yoon & Jeannette Neumann, S&P Moves to Revamp its
CMBS Rating System, WALL. ST. J., June 4, 2012. Similarly, Egan-Jones, though the smallest rating
agency, has played an outsized role in shaping markets and spurring other rating agencies to be more
proactive by taking the lead in rating downgrades, such as high-profile downgrades of sovereign debt and
the investment firms Jefferies Group. See Jean Eaglesham & Jeannette Neumann, Egan-Jones Rating Firm
in SEC Sights, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 19, 2012. Despite these glimmers of hope, the leading rating agencies
continue to enjoy overwhelming dominance. See U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ANNUAL
REPORT ON NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATIONS 11 (March 2012) (noting that
the three leading rating agencies account for approximately 97% of ratings, a percentage which was
unchanged from the previous year’s report).
41
See Hill, supra note 18, at 59-60.
42
See Hill, supra note 18, at 59-61.
43
See Hill, supra note 18, at 59-64 (demonstrating that customers have no incentive to obtain
ratings from rating agencies other than Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s).
44
See Manns, supra note 3, at 1056-57.
45
See Manns, supra note 3, at 1052.
46
See, e.g., Dennis Hevesi, Residential Real Estate: Looser U.S. Lending Rules Are Protested,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2004, at B8 (discussing the insulating effect of assignee liability for securitization
issuers).
47
For example, Moody's earned $884 million in 2006, or approximately 43 percent of its total
revenue, from rating RMBS and CDOs. This number was triple the amount that Moody’s earned from
these debt instruments only five years earlier, leaving rating agencies with few incentives to scrutinize
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interconnection meant that rating agencies may have incentives to give the companies
they are monitoring the benefit of the doubt or to avoid pushing for additional
information for fear of jeopardizing their relationship.48 This concern may have
particularly shaped the reluctance of rating agencies to downgrade ratings for fear of
harming the financial status of issuers.49
Historically, Congress was reluctant to regulate the rating agency industry due to
the concern that government regulation would taint the independence of ratings.50
Instead, policymakers assumed that the reputational concerns of rating agencies would
provide strong incentives for their integrity and accuracy and eclipse any short-term gains
from turning a blind eye to client misconduct.51 Unfortunately, this assumption proved to
be incorrect as reputational constraints wane amidst bubble markets and amidst increases
in risk-seeking behavior by participants in financial markets.52
The weakness of reputational constraints is also partly a product of the nature of
ratings. Rating agencies can hide behind their own approaches to assessing risk through
a bucket system of categories and can use the opaqueness of ratings both to acknowledge
the reality of uncertainties and as a cover for inaccuracy.53 Rating agencies can also
elastically spin their failures as a product of the shortsightedness and knee-jerk reactions
of markets,54 because ratings focus on structural, long-term concerns.55 Thus, these
subprime debt instruments more closely. See John Glover, Regulators May Limit S&P, Moody's Structured
(Feb.
6,
2008),
Business,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=akhMWaeEmqvA&refer=home.
48
See ROY C. SMITH & INGO WALTER, Rating Agencies: Is There an Agency Issue?, in RATINGS,
RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 292-93 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002)
(discussing the potential for rating agencies to compete by offering more favorable ratings to issuers than
other rating agencies); Macey, supra note 18, at 342-43.
49
See Macey, supra note 18, at 342-43 (discussing how applying “nuclear” liability, such as
through ratings downgrades, can warp the incentives for securities intermediaries); see also Onaran, supra
note 3 (discussing over $500 billion in writedowns and credit losses from the subprime mortgage crisis).
50
Cf. Christopher M. Bruner, States, Markets, and Gatekeepers: Public-Private Regulatory
Regimes in an Era of Economic Globalization, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 125, 143 (2008) (describing how “[b]y
characterizing their ratings as opinions rather than investment advice, the agencies preserve potent defenses
to civil liability and direct regulation under U.S. law”).
51
See Coffee, supra note 17, at 1406. This reputational capital argument is frequently used to
justify self-regulation of securities intermediaries, such as rating agencies, lawyers, and accountants. See,
e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary?, 17 J. LEGAL STUD.
295, 303 (1988) (arguing that the reputational costs that accountants may face from failing to detect
wrongdoing provide them with adequate incentives to monitor their clients).
52
See Coffee, supra note 17, at 1412-13.
53
The opaqueness of ratings is one reason why some commentators have advocated for the
standardization of rating agency performance statistics. See, e.g., Bai, supra note 4, at 63-66, 101-04.
54
See, e.g., David Evans, Moody's Implied Ratings Show MBIA, Ambac Turn to Junk,
(May
30,
2008),
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a0tWb0sTTgu8 (discussing how Moody’s
has sought to rationalize the gap between market-based indicators of the financial health of bond insurers
MBIA and Ambac and its actual ratings).
55
See MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE OF CORPORATE BOND
RATINGS 7, 15 (2003) (discussing the emphasis on long-term concerns in determining ratings through the
process of “fundamental credit analysis”).

11

factors may blunt the force of reputational constraints. Lastly, rating agencies have
largely succeeded in defending their ratings as journalistic opinions protected by the First
Amendment, which raises a significant bar to liability.56
III. The Washington Way: Reform as a Substitute for Accountability
The enormity of the financial crisis, coupled with the degree of rating agencies’
culpability, put rating agencies firmly in Congress’s crosshairs.57 The condemnation of
rating agencies was so widespread that the main question in the run up to the Dodd-Frank
Act was not whether reforms were necessary, but what form they would take.58
Unfortunately, rating agency reforms have followed the classic Washington way of

56

See Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not like Other Gatekeepers 61
(Univ. San Diego Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 07-46, 2006) (discussing how rating agencies are
“largely immune to civil and criminal liability for malfeasance”). Courts have come out on both sides on
the question of whether ratings universally enjoy First Amendment protection, but issuers have remarkable
difficulty in pinning liability on the shoulders of rating agencies. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 & n.5 (1985) (noting in dicta that some forms of the rating
agencies’ “speech” may not require heightened First Amendment protection); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181,
210 n.58 (1985) (noting in dicta that “it is difficult to see why the expression of an opinion about a
marketable security should not also be protected”); In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2003)
(distinguishing some rating agency functions from those of a journalist for First Amendment purposes);
Quinn v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 168 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1999) (allowing a claim of negligence and
fraudulent misrepresentation against a rating agency to proceed, yet questioning the degree to which it is
reasonable to rely on the ratings); Am. Sav. Bank, FSB v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc., No. M8-85, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24102, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2002) (rejecting a rating agency’s claims of entitlement to
“journalist privilege” protections for its ratings); Newby v. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 751, 818,
819 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that ratings enjoyed “qualified” First Amendment protection in a case
alleging that the rating agencies failed to exercise reasonable care in changing their ratings because they
had rated Enron’s debt as investment-grade in December 2000); Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors
Servs., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 860, 860-61 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (holding that ratings are protected under a state
reporter privilege statute); In re Pan Am. Corp., 161 B.R. 577, 581-82, 584 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding
that rating agencies are protected by the First Amendment in spite of their profit motive); Abu Dhabi
Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying rating
agencies a First Amendment defense for ratings of structured finance products, because the product was
only targeted to a small pool of investors).
57
Grace Wong, Rating Agencies in the Hot Seat, CNNMoney (Sept. 25, 2007, 1:05 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2007/09/25/news/companies/rating_agencies_hearing/ (discussing the lead-up to
congressional hearings that scrutinized the role of the credit agencies in the financial crisis); see, e.g., Vikas
Bajaj & Mark Landler, Mortgage Losses Echo in Europe and on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2007, at
A1, C7 (discussing the scale of subprime mortgage CDO exposure facing banks and other creditors); Jody
Shenn & David Mildenberg, Subprime, CDO Bank Losses May Exceed $265 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 31,
2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aeOWjjdmu2pU (discussing how
almost half the subprime bonds rated by S&P in 2006 and early 2007 were cut or placed on review for
ratings downgrades in 2008, a fact which suggests rating agencies’ lax approach).
58
See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE
COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 1-2 (July 2008) (discussing the
shortcomings of rating agencies’ policies and procedures, internal audit processes, and surveillance of
complex RMBS and CDOs); WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 4, at 272 (discussing
the “fact that the rating agencies issued inaccurate ratings” and the role of “conflicts of interest inherent in
the ‘issuer-pays’ model” in rating agencies’ failures).
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accountability avoidance.59 Instead of directly addressing the central problems of rating
agency accuracy and the absence of competition, Congress chose a broad and conflicting
range of solutions.60 Legislators deferred to the SEC to sort out the problems of
implementation (and policy coherence).61 This way Congress wins with public opinion
by showing it made a far-reaching effort to address the widely acknowledged problems
with rating agencies. But Congress has a convenient scapegoat in the SEC if reforms in
practice fail to address the industry’s problems.62
A. The Three Competing Reform Schools of Thought
Part of Congress’s shortcomings are understandable, because legislators faced
immense pressure to address the causes of the financial crisis and to come up with a
solution in a hurry.63 Legislators’ need for speed led them to cherry pick a hodge podge
of conflicting approaches from each of the leading camps of rating agency reform. The
three major schools of thought were “regulated industry” advocates who called for
greater government intervention in the selection of rating agencies to address market
failure in combination with more rigorous public oversight and regulation;64 conventional
“passive” securities regulators who sought to strengthen competition and private
accountability through greater transparency and disclosure coupled with private causes of
action;65 and the “abolitionist” camp who called for marginalizing rating agencies by
removing government requirements for ratings.66 Adopting any one of these three reform
approaches could have provided a coherent blueprint for reform. But embracing all three
at once has led to conflicting visions of reform that may lead to predictable failure.
“Regulated industry” proponents called for greater government intervention to
resolve inherent conflicts of interest in the issuer-pays system and to sustain more
invasive oversight of rating agencies.67 Their premise is that rating agencies are needed
to assess credit risk, but that conflicts of interest created by the issuer-pays system
compromised the industry’s independence and integrity.68 The fact that debt issuers
chose and paid for rating agencies meant that rating agencies had structural incentives to
59

See, e.g., Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 9, at 57-58 (arguing that Congress exploits
the ability to delegate difficult decisions to administrative agencies to avoid direct accountability).
60
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to
Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1050, 1066 (2012).
61
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 60, at 1066.
62
See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 9, at 32-33 (observing that Congressional delegation to
administrative agencies serves as a blame-shifting device).
63
See Coffee, supra note 60, at 1050 (discussing how inconsistent or poorly designed reforms are
inevitable because Congress engages in rapid fire reform due to time and interest group pressures).
64
See, e.g., Bai, supra note 4, at 47, 97-98); Barnett, supra note 4, at 501-02; Coffee, supra note 4,
at 233-36; Listokin & Talbelson, supra note 4, at 94-95; Manns, supra note 4, at 1015-19; Gudzowski,
supra note 4, at 264-71.
65
See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 4, at 1144-50.
66
See, e.g., Macey, supra note 4, at 21-24; Frank Partnoy, supra note 4, at 1-2; Flannery, Houston,
& Partnoy, supra note 4, at 2086-88.
67
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 4, at 254-61.
68
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 4, at 232-35.
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inflate ratings and to delay downgrades to avoid biting the hands that feed.69 This market
failure required extraordinary government intervention in the selection and compensation
of rating agencies, as well as an expanded government role in holding rating agencies
accountable. The Franken Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act embraced this
perspective, by calling for the creation of an independent commission to select rating
agencies for asset-backed securities or for the SEC to choose an alternative approach that
addresses this conflict of interest.70
“Passive” securities regulation advocates believed the shortcomings of rating
agencies are a product of an absence of market-based competition and private
accountability.71 This view’s premise is that shedding greater light on ratings would
facilitate the testing of rating agencies’ reputations and enhance market-based
competition by creating a more level playing field for smaller players and new entrants.
Enhanced transparency and disclosure would increase competition and private oversight
and, coupled with the creation or strengthening of private causes of action, allow market
actors to hold rating agencies accountable.72 This view is at the heart of most securities
reforms over the past generation.73 Proponents of this view have faith that private
competition and accountability will succeed if government sets rules to the game that
foster competitive markets and private oversight.
The “abolitionist” camp believes government requirements for ratings created a
misguided reliance on ratings.74 From their perspective ratings are ineffective proxies of
credit risk at best, and the power of credit ratings turned solely on government
mandates.75 This view offers a sharp contrast to both the regulated industry and
conventional securities regulation approaches. Instead of trying to improve the quality or
independence of ratings, abolitionists believe marginalizing rating agencies will foster the
development of better alternatives for measuring credit risk. Therefore, they advocated
69

See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 4, at 232-35.
The Franken Amendment proposal called for an independent commission to select and
compensate rating agencies for structured finance products using a lottery or random assignment with an
eventual transition to performance-based selection. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939F, 124 Stat. 1376, 1889-90 (2010); see also Coffee, supra note
4, at 232-35 (noting that the Franken Amendment “sever[s] the connection between issuer payment and
issuer selection of the [credit rating agency]”).
71
See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 4, at 1142-44.
72
See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 4, at 1144-47.
73
See, e.g., Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Investor Protection, Enhancing
Oversight of Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a National Insurance Office: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 30 (2009) (statement of Comm’r Denise Crawford, Texas Securities
Commission) (noting that inclusion of a private right of action in the securities reform legislation at issue in
the hearing was “extremely important” due to limits on the resources of regulators to pursue all violations
of the securities laws).
74
See, e.g., Flannery, Houston & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 2086-88 (2010) (arguing that credit
default swap spreads offer a more accurate proxy of credit quality than ratings); Partnoy, supra note 39, at
682 (arguing that “rating agencies sell[] regulatory licenses under oligopolistic (or even monopolistic)
conditions”).
75
Macey, supra note 4, at 21-24 (2006) (arguing that credit ratings provide “no information of
value to the investing public”); Partnoy, supra note 18, at 65-67 (arguing that the only value added by
ratings is the “regulatory license” they provide to issuers by checking the box of regulatory requirements).
70
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abolishing government requirements for credit ratings and mandating that government
agencies develop alternative benchmarks for credit risk to address better the problem of
poor risk management.76
Each of these perspectives offers strikingly different conceptions of the problems
facing the rating agency industry. Incorporating reforms based on all three of these
discordant views was a remarkable exercise of legislative indecision. This all-of-theabove approach meant rating agency reform was a missed opportunity for delineating a
clear, consistent vision for how to overhaul the industry. While reforms addressed the
most egregious excesses of rating agencies in the run up to the crisis, the extent to which
the SEC can craft a coherent framework for overseeing rating agencies amidst the Act’s
disparate objectives remains to be seen.
B. The Evolution of Conflicting Regulatory Strategies
The Dodd-Frank Act’s approach to rating agency reform was striking, because it
was a marked departure from the traditional reliance on reputational constraints.
Although government requirements had made ratings virtually indispensable for debt
issues, policymakers had deemed the independence of rating agencies from government
as key to their legitimacy.77 Policymakers believed that rating agencies would not
compromise their integrity by issuing inflated ratings for short-term gain due to the fear
of losing their credibility in the long run.78 This logic shaped the SEC’s policy of
recognizing rating agencies as NRSROs. As discussed previously, until 2006 the criteria
for recognizing rating agencies was that they were “widely accepted” as “credible and
reliable . . . by the predominant users of securities ratings.”79 This approach simply

76

See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 18, at 80-81. Even before the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC anticipated
this approach by proposing new rules that would scale back requirements for issuers to secure ratings in
order to “reduce undue reliance on credit ratings.” See References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 40088, 40088 (proposed July 11, 2008) (proposing the
removal of some formal rule and form requirements for NRSRO ratings under the Securities Act of 1933
and the Exchange Act); References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,
73 Fed. Reg. 40124, 40124-25 (proposed July 11, 2008) (proposing the removal of some formal
requirements for NRSRO ratings under rules pursuant to the Investment Company Act of 1940 and
Investment Advisers Act of 1940); SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Proposed Rule: Security Ratings, Release No.
33-8940; 34-58071; File No. S7-18-08, at 1, 14-15, 50-53 (2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/33-8940.pdf [hereinafter SEC 2008 Proposed Rules] (proposing to
change rating requirements for money markets and investment companies, as well as for registered assetbacked securities).
77
See Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and Persistently
Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies in the
Current Regulatory Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227, 228 (2009) (discussing how rating
agencies have historically faced a lack of oversight due to deference to self-regulation).
78
See Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, The Credit Rating Industry, 19 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. Q.
REV. 1, 4 (1994) (arguing “[w]hile the current payment structure may appear to encourage agencies to
assign higher ratings to satisfy issuers, the agencies have an overriding incentive to maintain a reputation
for high-quality, accurate ratings”); Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 14 (arguing that reputational constraints
will sufficiently restrain rating agencies).
79
See SEC Concept Release, supra note 16, at 35260.
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laureled the existing dominant firms, yet came without meaningful strings attached of
public or private accountability.80
The first attempt at reforming rating agencies initiated a modest shift towards
greater public oversight, but primarily relied on passive regulation by mandating greater
transparency and disclosure.81 The 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act opened the
door for new entrants into the rating agency industry by creating a more clear process and
criteria for the SEC to recognize NRSROs.82 The Act also mandated greater disclosure
from rating agencies of ratings methodologies and conflicts of interest.83 Although a
handful of rating agencies took advantage of the relaxed NRSRO standards to enter the
industry, the presence of new small entrants did little to change the market power that the
dominant rating agencies enjoyed.84 The 2006 legislation also failed to create any
meaningful public or private means of holding rating agencies accountable. Regulators
continued to rely on the reputational fallout from rating agency disclosures or errors to
keep rating agencies in line.85
1. The Marginal Impact of Rolling Back Requirements for Ratings
With the onset of the financial crisis, Congress shifted from all but ignoring the
various schools of thought on rating agency reform to embracing each of them at once.
The most significant paradox of Dodd-Frank’s rating agency reform was that Congress
sought to marginalize rating agencies while simultaneously subjecting them to a range of
regulatory oversight that underscored rating agencies’ importance.
The central theme of marginalization efforts was to roll back the myriad federal
requirements for ratings in statutes, rules, and regulations.86 The logic was that the
government had legitimized the widespread reliance on ratings, and abolishing these
requirements would end the public endorsement of private assessments of credit risk.87
80

See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial
Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. Rev. 1553, 1674 (2008); cf. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327, 1327-1339 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 780-7) (creating greater
accountability standards for NRSROs).
81
See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, 120 Stat. at 1327, 1332-34.
82
See id. at 1329-32.
83
See id. at 1332-34.
84
See Kettering, supra note 80, at 1674, 1701 n.491 (discussing how the 2006 rating agency
legislation had at best marginal effects in increasing regulatory oversight and fostering competition).
85
Cf. Kettering, supra note 80, at 1700-01 (noting that the 2006 Act did not mandate any changes
to the dominant rating agency business model).
86
This approach built on earlier SEC proposals to scale back requirements for issuers to secure
ratings. See SEC 2008 Proposed Rules, supra note 76. The premise of these changes is to make clear that
investors should not “place undue reliance on the NRSRO ratings.” See References to Ratings of Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 40088, 40088-89, 40100 (proposed July 11,
2008). The emphasis is on the word “undue,” because regardless of whether these proposed rules are
implemented the problem of rating agency accountability will still exist. Entrenched market practices of
soliciting and relying upon ratings are likely to sustain the importance of ratings.
87
Cf. References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 Fed.
Reg. 40088, 40089 (proposed July 11, 2008) (“[T]here is a risk that investors interpret the use of the term
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The Act replaced requirements for ratings with language requiring investors to consider
the creditworthiness of securities, implicitly suggesting that investors should not focus
solely on ratings.88 Dodd-Frank required regulatory bodies to review and remove most
references to rating agencies and to develop their own broader standards of
creditworthiness to supplant the role of ratings.89 The Act also stripped rating agencies of
their Regulation FD exception, which had allowed them to access non-public information
about issuers.90
The message to the market was that rating agencies no longer enjoyed a
government imprimatur of legitimacy. In light of the failures of rating agencies,
encouraging public and private parties not to rely blindly on ratings was sensible. But the
question remains of whether removing requirements for ratings was necessary to convey
this message or counter-productive in denying the reality of ratings’ continued relevance
in the market. The shortcomings of rating agencies and the resulting financial fallout
during the crisis clearly conveyed a cautionary message about reliance on ratings far
more powerfully than a shift in government policy.
The dilemma is that the government is seeking to diminish reliance on ratings at a
time of significant financial uncertainty. In spite of the Dodd-Frank Act’s efforts to
reduce reliance on ratings, markets and many government agencies have indicated that
they will continue to rely on ratings as proxies of credit risk for the foreseeable future.91
The problem is that no viable alternative proxy for credit risk exists. The closest
alternative, credit default swap spreads, provides at best short-term snapshots of market
sentiment of risk.92 Instead, the Dodd-Frank Act is based on blind faith that the mandate
for public agencies to create alternative proxies for risk will lead to the creation of viable
substitutes.93 That may be wishful thinking as it fails to reflect the realities of the current
public and private ability to gauge risk in the turbulent wake of the financial crisis.
The closest alternative to ratings, credit default swaps, serve as an equivalent of
insurance against default events as holders of debt pay a “premium” to another party in

[NRSRO] in laws and regulations as an endorsement of the quality of the credit ratings issued by NRSROs,
which may have encouraged investors to place undue reliance on the credit ratings issued by these
entities.”).
88
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939,
124 Stat. 1376, 1885-86 (2010).
89
See id. at § 939A, 1887.
90
See id. at § 939B, 1887-88; Removal from Regulation FD of the Exemption
for Credit Rating Agencies, Release No. 9146, 99 SEC Docket 1550 (Oct. 4, 2010).
91
See, e.g., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CO., REFERENCES TO CREDIT RATINGS IN FDIC REGULATIONS 3-4
(2011), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/LA11-NI0117.pdf.
(discussing how efforts to come up with alternatives for reliance on credit ratings is a work in progress
because “[i]dentifying alternatives to credit ratings that are suitable for regulatory capital determinations is
challenging and involves policy tradeoffs”).
92
But see Flannery, Houston & Partnoy, supra note 4, at 2086-89.
93
See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural
Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2-5 (2008) (analyzing the past shortcomings of government
mandates for innovation).
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exchange for compensation if a default event occurs.94 The virtue of credit default swaps
is that they allow creditors to hedge against loss, and both the initial sale and resale prices
for these swaps serve as proxies for risk.95 Credit default swaps themselves, however,
have become speculative instruments as part of a multi-trillion dollar industry.96 The
speculative element of these instruments means that credit default swap holders may seek
to distort the actual risks of the marketplace and foster a false sense of security or panic
to serve their short-term ends.97 Credit default spreads also tend to reflect market
overreactions and thus lead to a very high rate of reversals of risk assessments.98 In
contrast, ratings seek to approximate the long-term creditworthiness of issuers, which
despite the shortcomings of ratings, is the time frame of most concern to regulators and
investors.99
The absence of credible alternatives to ratings means that regulatory bodies may
potentially embrace less accurate proxies of credit risk. Congress may have faith in
government entities’ ability to anticipate market risks. But this faith stands in contrast to
a long track record of government actors’ sluggishness in understanding and addressing
emerging risks in complex financial markets.100 When failure happens, the temptation
always is to have change for change’s sake in the hope that a better result will occur.101
But rolling the dice and betting that public agencies will suddenly understand risks better
is a significant gamble in itself. The move away from relative uniformity of risk
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assessments to a world in which each agency designs its own risk standards only
increases the likelihood that government actors will miss, or even intentionally
deemphasize, risk issues in order to fuel growth in a particular area of regulation. While
the independence of rating agencies has come under question by critics of the issuer-pays
system, government regulators may prove even more vulnerable to industry capture.
Removing requirements for ratings also potentially handicaps the ability of the
SEC to regulate rating agencies. If the government had the sole objective of stripping
rating agencies of their influence, then removing requirements makes sense. The
problem is that other parts of the Dodd-Frank Act treat rating agencies as regulated
industries subject to significant oversight and regulatory constraints.102 If treaties,
statutes, and rules require ratings by NRSROs, then every rating agency has a strong
incentive to continue to be certified as an NRSRO with its attendant SEC-imposed
regulatory framework and conditions. However, rolling back requirements for ratings
opens up the possibility that the leading rating agencies will simply opt out of NRSRO
status to avoid the regulatory burdens.
Abolishing requirements for ratings has not had the impact of marginalizing
ratings that proponents had hoped would occur. Ratings continue to be a de facto
requirement for most debt issues.103 This fact does not entirely dismiss the view that
rating agencies’ value came in part from regulatory requirements. But decades of
government requirements for ratings made ratings a virtual necessity, and market
practices are now so deeply entrenched that the removal of government mandates has had
little impact.104 It is also important to note, however, that ratings featured prominently in
the financial landscape before government requirements for ratings began in the 1970s.105
The combined impact of the historical practice of enlisting rating agencies, coupled with
decades of government requirements, has entrenched rating agencies for the foreseeable
future.
Opponents of ratings may correctly note that over the long haul the absence of
requirements for ratings will erode the influence of rating agencies if other credible
benchmarks of gauging risk emerge. But the reality is that the removal of requirements
for ratings has failed to have a significant impact in the short run.106 Instead, this aspect
of reform makes the SEC’s job more difficult. The ongoing influence of the leading
rating agencies underscores the fact that markets continue to value their opinions.

102

See, e.g., See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 932, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872-83 (2010).
103
See David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Poses Plan to Curb Reliance on Credit Ratings, but Regulators
Cite Difficulties, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/secposes-plan-to-curb-reliance-on-credit-ratings-but-regulators-citedifficulties/2011/04/27/AFv2yp0E_story.html.
104
See Hilzenrath, supra note 103.
105
See generally RICHARD SYLLA, A HISTORICAL PRIMER ON THE BUSINESS OF CREDIT RATINGS
21-24 (2001).
106
See Hilzenrath, supra note 103.

19

The elimination of the Regulation FD exception for access to non-public
information also appears to have had no meaningful impact. In theory this move is
significant in signaling that rating agencies do not receive special government protection
and that a level playing field of market information exists. But in practice rating agencies
have used non-disclosure agreements to secure access to non-public information, which
achieves through contract law the same access previously granted under Regulation
FD.107
2. The Potential for Transparency and Private Enforcement
While the Dodd-Frank Act moved partially in the direction of making rating
agencies into a regulated industry, the Act simultaneously moved in the direction of
relying on conventional private accountability tools. This passive securities regulation
approach sought to use transparency and disclosure requirements to facilitate private
monitoring and to enlist private plaintiffs to police rating agencies.
The Act requires greater disclosure of the qualitative and quantitative content of
credit ratings and of third party due diligence.108 While the SEC is expressly barred from
shaping the methodologies of rating agencies,109 the Act imposes procedural
requirements designed to heighten rating transparency.110 The board of directors for each
rating agency must approve the qualitative and quantitative approaches used in rating
methodologies.111 Rating agencies must publicly disclose the qualitative and quantitative
methods for each rating, consistently apply changes to methodologies and procedures,
and disclose methodological changes as well as significant errors.112 Rating agencies
must have procedures in place for determining the likelihood of defaults.113 The DoddFrank Act also calls for rating agencies to “clearly define and disclose the meaning of
[ratings] symbol[s]” and to apply these symbols “consistent[ly] for all types of securities .
. . for which the symbol is used.”114
Finally, rating agencies must add standardized disclosures with each rating that
detail the qualitative and quantitative methodology used, the assumptions that underpin
the analysis, the extent of third party due diligence, and caveats about the limits of
ratings.115 The legislation also requires disclosure of the revolving door between ratings
agencies and clients, so that investors and other private monitors can have a better
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understanding of the degree of potential conflicts of interest that arise from former raters
going to work for issuers, underwriters, or sponsors.116
The Act also details specific disclosure requirements to make it easier for ratings
users to gauge the performance of ratings as well as to understand the nature and limits of
ratings. Rating agencies must disclose the initial ratings and changes in ratings for each
rated security to facilitate comparisons across rating agencies.117 In addition, rating
agencies must periodically disclose information that indicates the degree of accuracy of
past ratings.118 This change appears to heighten incentives for rating agency accuracy,
but the devil is in the details as no clear standard exists as to what defines rating
accuracy. In cases of sudden credit deterioration or titanic defaults, rating agencies may
potentially be caught red-handed with inaccurate ratings. But in most cases rating
agencies can continue to assert that ratings were accurate at the time of issue.
The virtue of greater disclosure requirements from the government’s perspective
is that they facilitate greater private oversight while minimizing direct government
expenditures. Greater transparency may enable both public and private parties to more
easily detect abuses or deviations from rating agencies’ methodologies. But the degree to
which “sunlight” provisions lead to greater rating agency accountability or restraint is an
open question. Sunshine may make it harder for the most egregious excesses of rating
agencies to rear their ugly head in the future. But this approach does not deal with rating
agencies’ deeper problems caused by the absence of competition and accountability.119
3. The Rating Agencies’ Successful Rebellion
The Dodd-Frank Act tried to give teeth to private oversight by creating private
causes of action,120 but the Act’s attempts to foster private accountability faltered in
practice. Private causes of action were designed to complement transparency and
disclosure by providing incentives for a broad pool of actors to monitor and prosecute
deceptive ratings.121 The enlistment of private monitors could have been a viable strategy
by itself. But the SEC caved in the face of rating agencies’ defiance to expert liability
exposure and allowed rating agencies to sidestep the most significant private enforcement
tool created by the Act.
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The attempt to impose expert liability on rating agencies was one of the most
ambitious components, and most visible failure, of rating agency reform. Prior to the
Dodd-Frank Act, government regulations required the inclusion of ratings in the
registration statement for asset-backed securities.122 However, SEC Rule 436(g)
expressly exempted rating agencies from expert liability.123 The rule shielded rating
agencies from private liability for fraud in registration statements under Section 11 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.124
The Dodd-Frank Act, however, attempted to subject rating agencies to the same
expert liability as accountants face under Section 11,125 authorizing investors to sue rating
agencies for knowingly or recklessly issuing materially misleading ratings.126 This
change would have meant that rating agencies would face the burden of showing they had
reasonable grounds to believe and actually believed their ratings were accurate.127
But immediately after the Dodd-Frank Act came into effect the leading rating
agencies refused to allow the inclusion of their ratings in registration statements for assetbacked securities in order to avoid liability exposure. This move was a high-stakes game
of chicken between the leading rating agencies and the SEC that threatened to freeze
asset-backed securities markets which expressly required inclusion of ratings in
registration statements. The SEC blinked first and immediately suspended this part of the
legislation, first for six months and then for the indefinite future.128 This showdown
demonstrated unequivocally the power of rating agencies and their ability to push back
on government regulation. It also left a gaping hole in terms of private accountability.129
While investors had access to greater disclosures from rating agencies, they lacked access
to enforcement tools to hold rating agencies accountable.
The other private enforcement dimension of the Act lowered the pleading
standards for Rule 10b-5 anti-fraud liability.130 While significant in theory, in practice
the expanded pleading opportunities are unlikely to increase private litigation in any
significant way because rating agencies effectively have a safe harbor of due diligence
122

See 17 C.F.R. § 229.1120 (2005).
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1) (2011).
124
See id. While the SEC had considered revoking this special protection for rating agencies in
2009, it declined to do so presumably due in part to the fear of a backlash from rating agencies. See
Concept Release on Possible Rescission of Rule 436(g) Under the Securities Act of 1933, 74 Fed. Reg.
53114, 53114-15 (Oct. 15, 2009) [hereinafter SEC 436(g) Concept Release]; cf. Gretchen Morgenson, Hey,
S.E.C, that Escape Hatch Is Still Open, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2011, at BU1 (describing the rating agencies’
reaction to the possible imposition of expert liability).
125
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
939G, 124 Stat. 1376, 1890 (2010); SEC 436(g) Concept Release, supra note 124.
126
See Dodd-Frank Act § 933, 124 Stat. at 1883-84.
127
See id.
128
See Morgenson, supra note 124, at BU1.
129
A House committee voted to reinstate the Rule 436(g) exception for rating agencies provides
additional evidence of the agencies’. See HR 1539 (as voted on by H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., July 20,
2011).
130
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, with Dodd-Frank Act § 933, 124 Stat. at
1883-84.
123

22

compliance.131 Investors could always allege that rating agencies committed Rule 10b-5
fraud, which serves as the prophylactic anti-fraud provision for securities. This provision
was toothless in practice, however, because meeting the high pleading standard of
alleging particular facts that established a strong inference that rating agencies knew of or
recklessly made a material misstatement or omission was virtually impossible.132
The Dodd-Frank Act lowered the pleading standard, so that plaintiffs need only
allege particular facts that create a strong inference that rating agencies knowingly or
recklessly failed to conduct reasonable investigation of the factual elements underpinning
the portfolios.133 The Rule 10b-5 pleading changes in turn effectively create a safe
harbor from anti-fraud liability if rating agencies engage in due diligence, such as by
obtaining reasonable verification of the information from independent third parties.134
This provision complements other parts of the Act which call for third party due diligence
providers to certify that they have conducted a thorough review of the underlying debt of
asset-backed securities and to disclose their due diligence reports to the public.135
Ultimately, the Rule 10b-5 changes create incentives for large paper trails of due
diligence documentation, which will address the pre-financial crisis abuse of rating assetbacked securities with no or little diligence.
The shortcoming of the changes to the Rule 10b-5 pleading standards is their
narrow scope. First, the relaxed pleading standards focus only on due diligence and do
not provide an effective outlet for addressing other forms of potential ratings
deception.136 Second, the Rule 10b-5 pleading standards only allow a narrow window for
private oversight as private parties will only rarely uncover facts from which one can
strongly infer the absence of a reasonable investigation. This approach is likely rooted in
the concern that private liability could swiftly bankrupt rating agencies. But it comes at
the cost of marginalizing private oversight, especially given the abandonment of expert
liability exposure.
4. The Attempt to Transform Rating Agencies Into a Regulated Industry
In spite of efforts to rescind ratings requirements and rely on disclosures and
private enforcement, the Dodd-Frank Act’s primary impact was to move the rating
agency industry closer to becoming a regulated industry by attaching more strings to
NRSRO status. The Act imposed a broad range of governance, internal controls, and
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conflict of interest compliance requirements137 designed to address the worst excesses of
rating agencies during the CDO boom.138 The Act also centralized oversight authority in
the SEC’s Office of Credit Ratings, which is tasked with conducting annual
examinations, monitoring internal controls, issuing inspection reports, and imposing
penalties on wayward rating agencies.139
Governance and internal control reforms emphasized independent oversight and
internal risk management, which significantly built on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s
emphasis on director independence and oversight.140 Faith in director independence has
become a virtual gospel of good corporate governance since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and
the Dodd-Frank Act significantly expands on this combination of internal oversight and
external accountability.141 At least half of the members of boards of directors of rating
agencies must consist of independent directors, and investors must have representation on
the boards.142 The legislation calls for the boards of directors of rating agencies to
exercise specific oversight roles in examining methodologies and models, accuracy,
internal controls, and conflict of interest compliance.143 Each rating agency must have an
independent chief compliance officer who submits an annual report on compliance with
regulatory obligations to the rating agency and the SEC.144 Rating agencies must also
enforce internal controls to ensure compliance with their rating methodologies, and
submit annual reports on their compliance to the SEC.145 These explicit director
oversight roles and reporting requirements to the SEC make rating agencies increasingly
resemble a regulated industry. But it remains to be seen whether this approach will
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enhance rating agency accountability. It is unclear how effective independent directors
and internal controls will be in addressing the problems of rating agencies.146
The Dodd-Frank Act also imposed conflict of interest restrictions and due
diligence requirements. The SEC is tasked with enacting rules to ensure that rating
agencies avoid having their efforts to solicit business affect ratings.147 To that end, rating
agencies must expressly affirm that each rating was not affected by its “business
activities” and instead is based solely on its independent evaluation of the risks and
merits of the debt issue.148 Rating agencies must publicly disclose when employees
involved in the ratings process leave to join an issuer, underwriter, or sponsor and review
the past year of ratings for the companies involved to uncover the impact of any conflicts
of interest.149 The emphasis on internal controls and conflict of interest compliance deal
with the worst excesses prior to the financial crisis in which due diligence was cast to the
wayside and conflicts of interest appear significant.150 The problem is that these reforms
only skirt the deeper issues of rating agencies’ incentives and ability to gauge risks in a
timely and accurate way.
5. The Potential and Limits of the Office of Credit Ratings
The Dodd-Frank Act mandated the creation of the SEC’s Office of Credit Ratings
to fulfill the new oversight roles by monitoring the activities of Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations (“NRSROs”).151 The virtue of the Office of Credit
Ratings is that it establishes a locus of accountability. The uncertainty is whether the
Office is adequately equipped to oversee rating agencies or whether it will prove to be a
toothless tiger. The success of the Office will turn on the enforcement tools at its
disposal and the political will to fulfill its duties of enforcing statutes and rules governing
rating agencies’ conduct, protecting users of ratings, promoting rating accuracy and
greater disclosure, and ensuring that conflicts of interest do not unduly affect ratings.152
The Office’s monitoring role is primarily oriented towards identifying potential
problems for future rulemaking. The Office is charged with conducting annual, riskbased examinations of rating agencies and assessing rating agencies’ compliance with
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their own standards.153 The Office will issue reports to Congress and the SEC
Commissioners about rating agency compliance and can make recommendations for
future rules.154
Troubleshooting emerging problems is important, and an area where the SEC has
room for substantial improvement.155 But the key to the Office of Credit Ratings’
success will turn on the scope of its enforcement powers and the degree to which these
powers are exercised. Federal law expressly recognizes that the SEC cannot regulate the
substance of rating agency methodologies,156 but the SEC may nonetheless subject rating
agencies to procedural requirements and liability for fraud.157 For example, rating
agencies are required to file their registration applications and annual reports with the
SEC, which may serve as a basis for actions for false or misleading statements.158 Rating
agencies face potential liability for failure to supervise their employees who engage in
fraudulent conduct.159
Additionally, rating agencies are obligated to act as
whistleblowers to regulators if they receive credible information that issuers have
committed or are committing material legal violations.160
Rating agencies can address their supervisory and whistleblowing roles by
strengthening internal controls. Enacting and implementing internal controls will give
rating agencies a prophylactic defense that they have taken reasonable measures to detect
issuer or internal fraud. But it is far from clear that expanding the SEC’s anti-fraud
powers will do much to enhance the quality of ratings beyond creating incentives for
rating agencies to take internal steps to avoid blatant abuses.
One potential wild card of Dodd-Frank is that the Act vests the SEC with the
power to suspend or revoke NRSRO registration if it determines that the rating agency
lacks the financial or managerial resources to produce credible ratings.161 The odd
dichotomy is that the SEC has done little to pursue the leading rating agencies for their
failures in the run up to the financial crisis, while its most prominent enforcement action
has been against the smallest, most independent rating agency, Egan Jones.162
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The SEC has taken modest steps towards scrutinizing rating agency conduct
during the run up to the crisis.163 But the SEC has considered pursuing actions against
rating agencies for fraud in only a handful of cases, in spite of the widespread consensus
that lax ratings were a significant factor in the crisis.164 This inaction raises the concern
that the Office of Credit Ratings will primarily serve to identify problems and make
recommendations for rule making, rather than to heighten enforcement or address the
shortcomings of rating agencies in real time.
In contrast, the SEC’s most significant enforcement action has been the attempt to
suspend the smallest rating agency, Egan-Jones.165 Sean Egan, co-founder of EganJones, has been one of the most vocal critics of the SEC for its inaction in the face of lax
ratings that understated market risks.166 The SEC has forcefully struck back in alleging
that Egan-Jones made material misstatements about its experience and internal controls in
its 2008 NRSRO application to rate government and asset-backed securities.167 Not only
may this case have a chilling effect on future industry reformers and potential entrants,
but it also raises questions about the SEC’s earnestness in enacting reforms.168
Another challenge the Office of Credit Ratings faces is manpower and resource
constraints. The SEC’s chronic funding problems mean it is outmanned and outgunned
in almost every financial area under its jurisdiction.169 Allocating a staff of
approximately twenty-five people to oversee the rating agency industry ensures that the
Office of Credit Ratings will be chronically over-stretched.170 Even to the extent the
Office seeks to proactively initiate enforcement actions, its reach will be necessarily
limited. The independence and ability of the Office to fulfill its mandate is also an open
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question, because the first nominee to head the Office is a Wall Street insider who may
have little interest in truly shaking up the rating agency industry.171 It also remains to be
seen whether the rank and file members of the Office possess both the independence and
sufficient industry understanding to fulfill their oversight roles.
IV. Replacing the Issuer-Pays System
The Dodd-Frank Act’s most significant reform rests on the most uncertain
foundation: the SEC’s mandate to address the conflict of interest created by issuers
selecting and paying their rating agency gatekeepers. The Franken Amendment literally
sought to transform rating agencies fully into a regulated industry by calling for the
creation of an independent commission to select rating agencies for structured finance
products using a lottery or random assignment system with an eventual transition to
performance-based selection.172 The SEC has the option of adopting the Franken
Amendment or developing its own alternative to address the conflicts of interest arising
from the issuer-pays system.173
The underlying logic of the Franken Amendment was that ratings are necessary
for assessing credit risk, but that market failure and barriers to entry require the
extraordinary regulatory restrictions and oversight typical of a regulated industry.174 The
positive dimension of this open-ended reform process is that it is intended to create a
system that would insulate rating agencies from issuer influence and create a more open
market for rating agency competition.175 This approach places the government squarely
in the middle of the question of how to facilitate greater competition that enhances rating
accuracy, a topic explored in greater depth later in the article.176
Rating agency opposition led to a watering down of the proposal in the final
legislation to a mandate that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and SEC
conduct a series of studies over two years to consider the Franken Amendment and other
alternatives for the current issuer-pays system.177 The SEC must implement the Franken
Amendment’s proposal “unless the Commission determines that an alternative system
would better serve the public interest and the protection of investors.”178 This language
vests the SEC with sweeping discretion, as it is a virtual tautology that any decision the
SEC makes is designed to further the public interest and protect investors.
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It remains to be seen whether the SEC will embrace the Franken Amendment’s
framework or forge an alternative framework. The GAO published two reports
identifying a range of potential alternatives.179 But the GAO’s reports shy away from any
concrete recommendations and instead counsel the SEC to conduct further study on the
viability of these potential alternatives.180 This recommendation implicitly suggests the
concern that the existing reform proposals are under-developed and that it may be
premature to implement such a significant overhaul of the rating agency industry.
Additionally, both a public and behind the scenes clash is taking place between
rating agencies and the federal government over the future of rating agency regulation.
For example, although Senator Franken has made abolition of the issuer-pays system one
of his signature issues and has publicly called on the SEC to follow through on
implementing an alternative framework for selecting rating agencies,181 the underlying
politics may be more subtle. The high-profile downgrade of the federal government’s
credit rating in August 2011182 was arguably one example of the larger struggle between
the rating agencies and the federal government. Standard & Poor’s downgraded the
federal government, and all three of the leading rating agencies engaged in muscleflexing by openly criticizing the federal government’s fiscal policies during the summer
of 2011.183 The increased scrutiny of the federal government’s credit rating can be
interpreted as a shot over the bow which underscored the ability of rating agencies to
affect the United States and world markets. The brilliance of this strategy is that no one
could fault rating agencies for being more proactive and timely in their ratings as that was
an objective of the Dodd-Frank Act.184 It remains to be seen whether the possible threat
of further downgrades of the United States may cause the SEC to exercise restraint and
either not follow through on implementing an alternative to the issuer-pays system or
embrace a watered-down solution.
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As importantly, the SEC may be over-stretched and overwhelmed in
implementing its sweeping mandate under the Dodd-Frank Act.185 The SEC may be
reluctant to enact dramatic changes for the rating agency industry since so many other
parts of the Dodd-Frank Act are works in progress.186 At a time of continued economic
uncertainty, there may be a lack of political will to follow through on an overhaul of the
rating agency industry. For these reasons the SEC may find more modest changes
sufficient to enhance the quality of credit ratings.
If the SEC does implement an alternative system for selecting rating agencies,
however, the rating agency industry could face a sea change. The devil is in the details
though in considering the extent to which alternative proposals would facilitate
competition by smaller rating agencies and new entrants. The related concern is whether
and to what degree alternative selection approaches would foster rating agency accuracy.
Selecting rating agencies based on performance is enticing rhetoric, but the challenge is
determining whether performance standards may perversely distort ratings or accentuate
herding effects.
A. The Potential Models for Replacing the Issuer-Pays System
Because the biggest question facing rating agency reform is how to replace the
issuer-pays system, it is important to understand the strengths and weaknesses of each of
the major proposals. The GAO identified a range of potential alternatives to the issuerpays system which fall into three camps: government intermediation in selecting rating
agencies; rating agencies independently choosing which issues to rate with a variety of
funding mechanisms; and a mandate for ratings from new government or investor-owned
rating agencies.187 While the proposals vary in terms of whether issuers and/or investors
would pay for ratings, a common theme is that the conflict of interest problem arises from
the influence that debt issuers may exercise by selecting rating agencies, not necessarily
from the fact that debt issuers pay for ratings.188 Ratings could plausibly either be
financed by a user fee imposed on debt issuers or a transaction fee from the sales of
bonds paid by debt purchasers.189
The independent rating agency approach would empower rating agencies to
choose which debt issues to rate and comprise an alternative to issuer funding (to mitigate
issuers’ influence derived from footing the bills). Under a standalone model, a
transaction fee for initial issuance and secondary trading would fund rating agencies and
would be distributed by a third party intermediary.190 Alternatively, under a designation
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model, securities holders or users could direct ratings fees to the rating agencies they
deemed most accurate.191
The problem with both approaches is that no clear method exists for increasing
incentives for rating agency accuracy. Both approaches would free rating agencies from
ties to issuers, but they would only succeed to the extent that rating agencies focus on
building their reputations for accuracy and integrity — the traditional constraint that
failed in the run up to the crisis.192 Having end users choose which rating agencies to
fund creates the potential for private accountability. But in practice, it appears unlikely
that most investors would have the information, ability, or incentives to take on this role.
The problem of risk dispersion looms large because if every end user has to chip in a
small amount, then there may not be any financial incentive to invest greater resources in
monitoring rating agencies and directing funds to the perceived best performers.193
Ironically, uncertainties about compensation may drive smaller rating agencies out of the
market and entrench the leading rating agencies.
The government or investor-owned rating agency camp calls for a mandate for
ratings from a new form of rating agency to offer competition to the existing rating
agencies.194 Their shared premise is that the leading rating agencies are so entrenched
that the only way to foster viable competition is to create it out of whole cloth.195 In the
wake of sovereign debt downgrades, European Union politicians explored the possibility
of creating a government-funded rating agency to offer a rival to the American-based
rating agencies.196 A government-owned rating agency would be independent from
issuers,197 but the “solution” would simply replace one conflict of interest with another.
Markets would likely not trust ratings issued by a government-linked entity for fear that it
would inflate the ratings of companies who enjoy the government’s favor.198
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In contrast, the advocates of an investor-owned rating agency argue that a
mandate for a rating from an investor-owned rating agency would induce investors to
create rating agencies with independence from issuers.199 The challenge facing this
approach is that institutional investors are the most likely candidates to form a rating
agency.200 But they are also the least likely to want to share informational advantages
with the market, because leveraging these advantages is literally how they make
money.201 Investor-owned rating agencies would also bring their own biases which
would open up temptations to inflate ratings of assets the investors own or to downplay
ratings in areas of potential future acquisitions.202 For these reasons, it may make more
sense to produce incentives for greater competition among existing rating agencies or to
encourage new entrants who do not simply bring new types of conflicts of interest to the
table.
The various government intermediation proposals share a common core with the
Franken Amendment in calling for an independent commission or board to select rating
agencies. The key question for each of these approaches is what mechanism a
government body should use to select rating agencies and how effectively each of these
approaches would enhance rating agency accuracy and timeliness. Four alternative
selection mechanisms have been proposed. An independent commission could select
rating agencies randomly, employ a rotating assignment of rating agencies, base rating
agency assignment on past performance, or oversee a bidding system for the right to
rate.203
While a random assignment or rotation approach would eliminate the problem of
issuers selecting rating agencies, neither approach would do anything to create incentives
for rating agency accuracy. In the name of fostering the growth of smaller rating
agencies, it could potentially create an entitlement system for private rating agencies who
would receive assignments and funding solely due to their NRSRO status. These two
approaches would undermine competition and potentially erode incentives for timely and
accurate ratings. For this reason, random assignment or a rotation approach could serve
at best as temporary, makeshift steps towards creating a more permanent selection
process that facilitates competition.
The two main alternatives are to design a system in which rating agencies
compete and are compensated based on their performance or to create a bidding process
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in which past performance is one of a set of factors weighed in determining which rating
agencies are chosen for future debt issuances. The challenge of both of these approaches
is that no clear consensus exists on what performance-based standards to use to assess
rating agencies.204 Proposals have suggested creating peer comparison models to
examine whether rating agencies’ percentage of predicted default of debt instruments
deviated from peers and whether annual yields of identically rated debt securities from
different asset classes varied in a significant way.205 The dilemma of either of these
performance-based metrics is that they may accentuate herding effects. Rating agencies
would have greater incentives to engage in conscious parallelism to avoid liability, which
could undercut the objectives of greater accuracy and accountability. Herding effects are
already an issue in an oligopolistic industry,206 and the solution could exacerbate the
problem. An additional concern is that the benchmark would swiftly become the
centerpiece of rating agencies’ methodologies, regardless of whether the standards
incentivize accuracy and timeliness.
Another concern in pegging selection to past performance is that the standard
caveat of every investment advertisement may apply207 - past performance may not be
indicative of future results. For example, the historical performance of rating agencies
may have looked reasonably good up until the financial crisis. In fact, arguably inflated
ratings for mortgage-backed securities matched the inflated expectations about the
housing market as a broad range of actors were caught up in unrealistic expectations.208
A performance standard may not capture red flags until it is too late, and rating agencies
will have failed once again to highlight growing credit risks.
A related issue is the impact of standardization of ratings, which is a likely
corollary to efforts to create performance-based benchmarks. In theory, standardizing
ratings will help facilitate comparability and creating performance-based tests will foster
accountability.209 But the danger exists that these approaches may undercut rating
agencies’ incentives to create their own distinctive tests of risk. Ratings may potentially
add more value when rating agencies are applying different tests of risk. The evolution
of multiple alternative standards may lead to identification of some emerging risks that a
single-performance standard would miss. Market-based incentives are also needed for
rating agencies to innovate. If a single lesson emerged from the financial crisis, it is the
government’s inability to anticipate the impact of financial innovation,210 and the
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combination of standardization of ratings and performance-based evaluations could have
perverse effects.
The SEC may also lack the wherewithal to implement meaningful change. The
SEC’s capitulation on expert liability for rating agencies was a telling lesson. Regulators
quickly came to the conclusion that the danger of disruption to credit markets was too
great to hold the line on demanding the inclusion of ratings in asset-backed security
registration statements with its attendant expert liability exposure.211 If the SEC
suspended this more modest reform, then it appears much more unlikely that the SEC
will embrace comprehensive reform of the issuer-pays system.
B. The Accountability Challenge
These concerns about the fate of the Franken Amendment highlight the fact that
the Dodd-Frank Act leaves unresolved the difficult question of how to define the
benchmark for assessing rating agency performance. One of the remarkable features of
the ratings agency industry is that markets have historically valued ratings even though
no clear benchmark for accuracy exists.212 The past reputation of rating agencies alone
legitimized the role of ratings as a proxy for creditworthiness in the eyes of the market.213
In turn, well-established reputations were sufficient for rating agencies to serve as
NRSROs.214 The legitimacy logic was circular as a rating agency needed a wellestablished track record to achieve NRSRO status, which meant new entrants could not
viably compete. While 2006 legislation eased access for new entrants,215 the fact that
market participants and regulators did not fully comprehend the nature and limits of
ratings exacerbated the moral hazard. The absence of any standard for accountability
also created a recipe for abuse by issuers and rating agencies, as it made it easier to bend
the rules during market frenzies.216
The Dodd-Frank Act recognizes that rating agencies’ inconsistent applications of
their own standards is a clear red flag that requires regulators’ attention, and tasks the
Office of Credit Ratings’ with overseeing this mandate.217 Identifying rating agencies’
inconsistent application of their methodologies represents a step of progress in making it
more difficult for rating agencies to weigh the rating scale in favor of issuers.
But
this approach alone only addresses one dimension of potential conflicts of interest.
211

See Morgenson, supra note 124, at BU1 .
Examining the Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Capital Markets: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 69 (2005) (statement of Stephen Joynt,
President and CEO, Fitch Ratings).
213
See White, supra note 192, at 215 (arguing that rating agencies' reputational concerns
historically mitigated the impact of conflicts of interests).
214
See SEC Concept Release, supra note 16, at 35260.
215
See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
216
Cf. Credit Rating Agencies and the Next Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 63 (2009) (statement of Ilya Kolchinsky, Former Managing
Director, Moody’s Investors Service) (noting that, because most “standards come from the rating agency
itself,” rating agencies are “judge, jury, and executioner of their own standards”).
217
See About the Office of Credit Ratings, supra note 152.
212

34

Rating agencies may be completely consistent in applying their methodologies and
produce consistently inaccurate and untimely ratings that mislead investors. But
designing a benchmark for rating agency performance may prove very difficult, as no
consensus has developed on how to gauge rating agency performance.218 As discussed
above, any proposed benchmark may perversely accentuate herding effects among rating
agencies. They may cluster ratings around the benchmark, regardless of whether striving
to meet the standard fosters greater accuracy.
Part of the problem is there is a degree to which ratings are intentionally
ambiguous. Rating agencies provide gauges of the long-term, structural creditworthiness
of issuers, rather than a moment-by-moment picture of market reactions to risk.219
Ratings are designed to reflect a balanced tradeoff between accuracy and stability that
incorporate quantitative and qualitative analysis.220 They offer proximate measures of
risk designed to indicate buckets of relative risk.221 It is possible to find that a rating
agency is inconsistent when it offers similar ratings to financial products that end up
having very different results. But even in that case hindsight bias may lead to the
conclusion that rating agencies erred when in fact plausible quantitative and qualitative
grounds could have existed for granting similar ratings to debt that ultimately has
different outcomes. It may be difficult to grade ratings based off of snapshots in time,
because ratings cover broad-based categories of risk and rest in part on necessarily
speculative long-term assessments of financial wherewithal.222
The intentional ambiguity of ratings provides a liability shield for rating agencies
and plays into their argument that they are offering opinions that should merit First
Amendment protection.223 Practically speaking, perhaps only in cases of gross
negligence or fraud is the shroud of ambiguity so thin that it can be readily dismissed.
Even if policymakers decided on a set of standards for assessing rating agency
accuracy, rating agencies would have perverse incentives to converge their ratings on
whatever standard is set, especially if the standard was tied to compensation or their
eligibility for future ratings. Any benchmark for rating agency accuracy will be only as
effective as the underlying criteria. Because no clear criteria for rating agency efficacy
exist, any standard is likely to be incomplete and suffer from under or over-inclusiveness.
Even to the extent that a commission could devise effective benchmarks for accuracy at a
given time, the standards might lag behind emerging risks since regulators may not
recognize market changes until it is too late. Rating agencies would have incentives to
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embrace such outdated performance standards as the definitive verdict of accuracy
regardless of whether the criteria are directly correlated with rating accuracy.
Standards for assessing rating agency performance would ironically accentuate
already strong herding effects among rating agencies, which is one of the basic problems
plaguing the industry.224 Commentators have documented that the leading rating
agencies often mimic each other’s ratings, especially in terms of rating downgrades.225 A
standard for benchmarking rating agency accuracy may give rating agencies even greater
incentives to walk in lock step with one another. This approach would be logical for
rating agencies, because they would benefit from operating in tandem, as each individual
rating agency would be shielded from criticism for industry-wide mistakes. In contrast,
rating agencies would not have incentives to stick their necks out and make ratings that
stand out from the rest of the industry. The downside risk of wrongly deviating from the
herd would likely outweigh the potential benefits from being right.
Assessing the timeliness of rating changes is even more difficult. Rating agencies
have repeatedly received heaps of scorn for downgrading ratings too slowly.226 Perhaps
the most egregious case is Enron, which each of the major credit rating agencies rated as
investment grade until four days before its collapse.227 But policymakers may open up a
Pandora’s box of self-fulfilling downgrades to the extent that rating agencies are assessed
on or their compensation tied to the timeliness of ratings. Rating agencies may have
incentives to issue steep downgrades at earlier times, potentially fueling panics that help
to foster the outcomes rating agencies predict.
A related concern is that if rating agencies are judged by how quickly they pull
the trigger to assess the impact of changes in risk, such criteria may destabilize markets
by incentivizing rapid upgrades or downgrades of securities. Rapid changes may result in
increased trading volatility and magnify the impact of false positive or negative ratings.
Alternatively, if changes become too frequent markets may paradoxically begin to block
out ratings changes due to information overload and therefore be less sensitive to
emerging risks.228 For these reasons policymakers need to grapple carefully with the
dangers of unintended consequences from designing benchmarks for rating agency
performance.
Given these significant concerns, it may be prudent for policymakers to recognize
that performance standards are at best years away and that benchmarks may create as
many problems as they “solve.” Regulators should consider potential strategies for
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enhancing competition and private policing of rating agency conduct, rather than
focusing on pinning down benchmarks for rating agency accuracy. Fostering greater
competition is critical to unraveling two key interconnected problems: the entrenchment
of a rating agency oligopoly and herding effects that stifle rating agency accuracy. In
addition, expanding the scope of private causes of action will enlist investors in a
complementary role to public enforcement efforts to hold rating agencies accountable.
C. The Potential and Limits of Competition
Efforts to foster competition need to address two related issues: the role of
oligopolistic industry dominance in stifling competition and the impact of herding effects
in reducing rating agency accuracy.229 Oligopolies present a double curse in both
thwarting competition and facilitating herding by making it easier for each leading firm
to observe and mimic the others’ approaches.230
As discussed earlier, the challenge is that three leading rating agencies dominate
the industry, and significant barriers to entry make it difficult for new or smaller entrants
to pose plausible alternatives.231 The traditional standard for SEC recognition of a rating
agency as an NRSRO was having an established track record of rating debt,232 which
created a chicken and egg problem. Only the dominant established players, Moody’s,
Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch had the experience and reputation to secure significant
business.233 Every other potential competitor was so small as to be virtually insignificant,
and new entrants could not gain enough market share to secure recognition by the SEC
or, more importantly, to gain legitimacy in the market.234
The 2006 reforms opened the door a bit more widely in creating the appearance
of greater competition, but did not create the substance.235 Eased requirements for
recognition as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization led to a modest
increase in the number of rating agencies, but it did little to nothing to level the playing
field for new entrants.236 Even if the law did not require substantial experience for
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recognition as an NRSRO, the market demanded experience which small and new rating
agencies simply did not have.237
In 2009 the SEC went a step further in seeking to level the playing field for new
entrants by creating an “equal access” requirement under Rule 17g-5.238 Under this equal
access rule, rating agencies must reveal any information acquired from issuers of
structured finance products to other NRSROs.239 This rule sought to prevent the leading
rating agencies from leveraging their power to cut smaller players off from the
information flows they need to develop and enhance their competing rating models.240
While this reform was a positive step in aiding smaller competitors, leveling the playing
field of information flows has not proven sufficient to erode the leading rating agencies’
market positions.241 This fact raises the question of whether heightened competition is
even possible without more invasive action to open up opportunities for smaller firms and
to reduce the market share of the leading firms.
As noted earlier, the Franken Amendment’s ultimate goal is to expand
opportunities for competition by abolishing the issuer-pays system.242 The challenge is
the degree to which a performance-based selection process will heighten competition or,
alternatively, foster herding effects. The herding effect problem is intertwined with the
challenge of increasing competition in an oligopolistic industry. Market concentration
arguably facilitates herding effects, both in inflated initial ratings and market
downgrades. Just as gas stations across from each other can easily see one another’s
prices and raise or lower their own prices accordingly in fully legal conscious parallelism,
the leading rating agencies can easily mimic each other’s ratings to minimize the risk of
being singled out as overly aggressive or passive in initial ratings, downgrades, or
upgrades.243
Proponents of greater competition generally believe that the presence of more
participants will break down this herd mentality. New entrants would have incentives to
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distinguish themselves based on the timeliness and accuracy of their ratings.244 The
problem is that greater competition alone may not necessarily diminish herding
incentives. As discussed previously, if benchmarks for rating accuracy are used either to
evaluate rating agencies or to select and/or compensate rating agencies, then herding
effects may be magnified for all participants. The risk of being outside the herd may
prove too much in that the downside of exposure as an outlier may be far higher than the
upside of being a standout for accuracy. The negative risk to the bread and butter of a
rating agency’s business may outweigh the benefits of taking risks in asserting
independence from the herd. So the irony is that strategies regulators may use to increase
competition may actually incentivize greater convergence and mimicry. For this reason
regulators need to consider carefully how to facilitate competition in a way that does not
inadvertently thwart the objectives of rating agency reform.
The challenge facing rating agency reform is that it is far from clear both how to
promote competition in an oligopolistic industry and whether competition in itself will
produce incentives for greater ratings accuracy. Four approaches towards increasing
competition are worth considering. First, some commentators have argued that rating
agencies may be the financial equivalent of natural monopolies (which could be more
accurately framed as “natural oligopolies”). Therefore, the introduction of more than a
handful of participants may create destructive competition and fuel rating inflation.245
Second, others have put their faith in the abolition of the issuer-pays system and argued
that a government board could provide a more level playing field in selecting rating
agencies.246 Third, other proponents advocate for a mandate for investor-owned rating
agencies to create incentives for the creation of new forms of rating agencies or for the
government to create its own rating agency.247 This article suggests a fourth approach:
the break-up of the leading rating agencies in order to produce a critical mass of
successors who share in the reputational legitimacy of their predecessors.
“Natural oligopoly” proponents argue that the financial crisis occurred due to too
much competition. Their concern is that increased competition may allow issuers to play
one rating agency off another to secure inflated ratings.248 It may seem more than ironic
to argue that too much competition exists in a world of three leading rating agencies. But
the advocates of this view argue that rating agency independence may only be possible
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when issuers are forced to deal with a limited number of rating agencies and cannot shop
for this gatekeeping service.249
Issuers routinely secure two ratings,250 and therefore if Standard & Poor’s and
Moody’s had continued to serve exclusively as the gold standard, then issuers would have
little choice but to accept ratings from these companies. Natural oligopoly proponents
argue that Fitch’s evolution starting in 2000 from the junior partner of the leading raters
into a virtual equal drove ratings inflation.251 Because issuers had a viable third rating
agency to choose, they could and did engage in ratings shopping which led to a race to
the bottom among rating agencies.252 The opportunity for ratings shopping occurred at a
time of increasing concentration of asset-backed securities markets, giving issuers even
more leverage in demanding lax ratings in exchange for business.253
While it is true that the rise of Fitch’s business is correlated with inflated ratings
in asset-backed securities, it is far from clear that the problem stemmed from increased
competition.254 The financial crisis was not the first time that rating agencies erred on a
large scale as rating agency performance arguably has a cyclical nature.255 The crisis was
notable for the degree of egregiousness in ratings inflation, not for the fact that ratings
were lax, which has been a systematic problem. An equally consistent explanation of the
events leading to the financial crisis is that rating agencies were caught up in the herding
effects of the roaring 2000s, resulting in financial envelope pushing, if not fraud.256 That
in turn begs the question of how or whether greater competition could dampen the
herding effects and lead to more accurate and timely ratings.

249

See Vasiliki Skreta & Laura Veldkamp, Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of
Ratings Inflation, 56 J. Monetary Econ. 678, 686-88, 691 (2009) (arguing that the increasing complexity of
structured finance products created opportunities for issuers to pit rating agencies against each other in
shopping for the best ratings).
250
See Hill, supra note 18, at 59-60.
251
See Coffee, supra note 4, at 239-40 (noting how Fitch’s growth occurred in part through
mergers with smaller rating agencies Duff & Phelps in 2000 and Thomson Bankwatch in 2001).
252
See Becker & Milbourn, supra note 248, at 9 (finding that S&P’s and Moody’s bond ratings are
slightly lower for bonds that have a Fitch rating, which is “consistent with firms seeking out Fitch when
their ratings appear low relative to other measures of credit quality”).
253
See Coffee, supra note 4, at 238-39 (pointing out that the top six issuers controlled over 50% of
the mortgage backed securities market in 2007 and the top dozen issuers accounted for over 80% of the
market); Jie He, Jun Qian & Philip E. Strahan, Credit Ratings and the Evolution of the Mortgage-Backed
Securities Market, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 131, 135 (2011) (documenting that large issuers’ mortgage-backed
securities from 2000 to 2009 performed significantly less well than equally rated comparable MBS from
smaller issuers).
254
See Coffee, supra note 4, at 241 (observing that Fitch’s rise as a third leading rating agency
was correlated with an increase in investment grade ratings, yet conceding that “[b]y no means does this
data truly prove that competition cannot work”).
255
See Partnoy, supra note 4, at 4 (discussing credit rating agencies’ role in the bond market crisis
of 1994-95 and in the collapse of Enron).
256
See Mehrsa Baradaran, Reconsidering the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 385, 411 (2012) (discussing the role of herding effects that in fueling the financial crisis).

40

As discussed earlier, the creation of a government-controlled or investor-owned
rating agency would produce immediate competition.257 But a government-controlled
rating agency would face a significant legitimacy problem due to perceptions that it
would favor government-connected companies.258 A mandate for investor-owned rating
agencies to provide ratings would foster the emergence of new competitors.259 But these
rating agencies would also suffer a potential legitimacy problem due to concerns that
institutional investors would bring their own biases to the table.260
D. The Case for Breaking Up the Leading Rating Agencies
The government board approach is the standing option for increasing competition,
because it is the default for reforming the issuer-pays system laid out in the Franken
Amendment.261 The ultimate outlines of rating agency reform are still a work in progress
as the SEC grapples with its mandate to determine whether an alternative selection
method for ratings of asset-backed securities is feasible.262 While the SEC may possibly
use this opportunity to radically reform the rating agency industry, numerous questions
about the contours and impact of an alternative selection approach may thwart the
potential for reform.
It is possible that even if the SEC embraces the Franken Amendment in its
entirety that the landscape of rating agencies will remain surprisingly unchanged. In
theory a selection process that opened up opportunities for smaller rating agencies to
receive rating opportunities could help to level the playing field. Over time the smaller
rating agencies could distinguish themselves based on the accuracy and timeliness of
their ratings. In the short term the selection process would implicitly be a subsidy
program that provides smaller rating agencies with more work and, therefore, greater
market share.
Unfortunately, an alternative selection approach may not work out as well as
envisioned. If the regulators design a system with restrictions that are too onerous, the
established rating agencies may opt out of the selection system or opt out of NRSRO
status entirely. The leading rating agencies could continue to prosper by offering marketrecognized ratings outside of any system the SEC constructs, because the leading
agencies’ imprimatur of legitimacy may continue to be essential for most debt issues.
The smaller rating agencies may receive a windfall from their selection to rate assetbacked securities, but may not necessarily receive the reputational benefit that comes
with rating a greater number of securities, at least not in the foreseeable future. The SEC
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may be left with a tremendous amount of investment in efforts to foster competition and
little to show for it.
If such efforts to foster competition will likely fall far short of their goals, the
SEC needs to consider other options. One alternative approach the SEC should consider
is breaking up the leading rating agencies. This divestiture approach has a simple logic.
Government requirements for ratings were integral to entrenching the leading rating
agencies and creating an oligopoly.263 Breaking up the leading rating agencies would
undo what government statutes and rules helped to create.264 Removing requirements for
ratings was insufficient to enhance competition because the damage was already done
due to decades of market expectations for ratings from the leading rating agencies.265
While the Franken Amendment and other proposals are bold, even an independent
selection process may not prove sufficient to legitimize smaller rating agencies and to
make them viable competitors to the leading rating agencies.
For this reason, to undo the damage of previous government requirements,
policymakers should consider a divestiture approach. Breaking up the leading rating
agencies would create smaller entities that would share in the reputational umbrella of
their larger predecessors. In this way policymakers could fast-track the creation of a
competitive pool of smaller rating agencies who enjoy market credibility. This approach
would also open up the possibility for smaller rating agencies to more plausibly compete,
because a set of industry monoliths would not crowd out their competitors.266
The challenge is that while the existence of a rating agency oligopoly has
anticompetitive effects, it is far from clear that antitrust law provides an existing basis to
justify mandating divestitures among rating agencies. Antitrust regulators do not possess
the authority to target anticompetitive oligopolies with the exception of cases in which
oligopolists engage in price-fixing agreements or other forms of express collusion.267 At
best antitrust regulators can only indirectly affect oligopolists by preventing acquisitions
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or mergers that will result in greater market concentration or conditioning merger
approvals on divestitures.268
The difficulty with potential antitrust enforcement against rating agencies is that
the leading rating agencies have no need for a meeting of the minds. Their market power
is deeply entrenched, and express collusion is unnecessary because rating agencies can
leverage the fact that most ratings are public information. Viewing the other leading
agencies’ publicly available disclosures about methodologies and ratings decisions
provides all the information they need for their strategies to converge.
Broadening antitrust laws to regulate oligopolies is one potential solution to this
problem, but one which is far beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the distinctive
nature of rating agencies may give regulators some unique tools to incentivize
divestitures by the leading rating agencies. One approach is to tie NRSRO status to
divestments. For example, this objective could be achieved indirectly by creating a
special certification for NRSROs of asset-backed securities (or for other segments of the
rating agency industry). Part of the criteria for certification as an NRSRO for assetbacked securities would be that the rating agency is independent from rating agencies for
other types of debt issues. This would ensure that rating agencies have a single-minded
focus on the risks of this asset class that played such a prominent role in the run up to the
financial crisis.269 This approach would remove the potential for rating agencies to give
deferential ratings to asset-backed securities in exchange for retaining or securing other
aspects of an issuers’ business.
The requirement for independent rating agencies could be phased in over a period
of years to give rating agencies sufficient time to divest or time for smaller rating
agencies or new entrants to focus on a particular ratings sector. This approach would
give the leading rating agencies the choice of vacating segments of the rating agency
industry or to break up their business into multiple entities to maximize shareholder
value. Standard & Poor’s parent company, McGraw Hill, has already spun off its
education division from Standard & Poor’s.270 This fact suggests that Standard & Poor’s
itself could be plausibly broken into separate entities to focus on different sectors of the
ratings’ market. Fitch grew in part through a series of acquisitions of smaller rating
agencies during the 2000s.271 Although antitrust regulators did not proactively identify
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threats from greater market concentration,272 this special designation of asset-backed
securities NRSROs would create incentives to undo some of the damage caused by
authorizing Fitch’s growth through acquisitions.273
This approach is feasible in part because of the scale of the structured finance
industry. Although asset-backed securities have not risen back to the heights of the
market boom, it has long served as one of the most lucrative and largest niches of rating
agencies’ portfolios.274 A potential critique of this approach would be that it could create
separate oligopolies between structured finance rating agencies and non-structured
finance rating agencies. But the smaller scale would give competitors greater ability to
focus on sectors of debt in which they could build experience and legitimacy and more
plausibly compete over time.275 If the number of viable competitors multiplied, the SEC
could consider transitioning back towards a system in which NRSROs were allowed to
compete for all types of ratings.276
Another strategy for decreasing market concentration would be to leverage the
Franken Amendment’s proposal for an alternative means to select rating agencies for
structured finance products. If the SEC embraces some version of an independent
selection process, it could condition rating agencies’ eligibility for the program on only
rating asset-backed securities. This approach would have similar results as attempting to
tie divestments by the leading rating agencies to NRSRO certification.
Alternatively, a rating agency selection commission could stack the deck in favor
of divestment by making market share one of the considerations for allocating ratings
business and systematically favoring smaller rating agencies. This approach may
implicitly create incentives for the leading rating agencies to divest this part of the
business, in order to remain competitive. The government routinely gives preferences to
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small businesses in government contracting.277 Therefore, there would be clear precedent
for offsetting the advantages larger firms enjoy and incentivizing divestments. At
minimum this approach would open up greater opportunities for smaller rating agencies
to prove themselves as viable competitors.
The downside of this strategy is that the leading rating agencies may choose to opt
out of NRSRO status or decline to participate in the alternative selection process for
asset-backed securities. The leading rating agencies may feel confident that the market
will continue to demand their services because of their long-standing reputations and that
any threat to their market share is distant at best. Additionally, the fact that the DoddFrank Act stripped so many requirements for ratings from government statutes and
regulations means that NRSRO status is less valuable than it was before.278 In other
words, stripping away requirements for ratings ironically took away some of the leverage
that the SEC has to tie restrictions to NRSRO status. For now NRSRO status is
voluntary,279 but if leading rating agencies seek to opt out of this status policymakers
should consider making it obligatory for issuing ratings to give regulators’ greater ability
to regulate the industry and foster competition.
E. Expanding Oversight by Investors
Enhancing rating agency competition should be the priority of policymakers. But
a related concern is the shortcoming of existing tools to hold rating agencies accountable.
The danger is that policymakers will rely too much on public oversight and place
excessive faith in regulators. Instead, policymakers should consider creating a broader
role for oversight and enforcement by investors as a complement to government
monitoring of rating agencies. Expanding the role for investor enforcement is especially
important, because the suspension of rating agencies’ expert liability exposure took away
much of the scope of private enforcement.280
The case for expanding private oversight depends on how much stakeholders
want reform to succeed fully. Having accurate and timely ratings is the professed
objective for reforms, and all stakeholders, including rating agencies themselves, publicly
affirm that goal.281 But a clear tension exists between this objective and the conflicting
277
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interests and priorities of regulators, issuers, and investors.282 The unspoken truth about
rating agency reform is that it is unclear the degree to which any party wants to move
towards a world of accurate and timely ratings.
The intrinsic conflict of interest that arises when issuers choose their rating
agency gatekeeper has received most of the attention from commentators.283 Issuers
understandably want inflated ratings and slow downgrades because these affect their
bottom line.284 But if ratings are too inflated, it will threaten both the credibility of
issuers and rating agencies. For example, issuers were stung by the fallout from the
financial crisis as the excesses of inflated ratings temporarily dried up demand for assetbacked securities.285 The saying “pigs get fat, hogs get slaughtered” applies. Although
issuers have every interest in staying fat with inflated ratings and delayed downgrades,
self-preservation demands that issuers will likely want to avoid a repetition of the most
egregious excesses of ratings during the run up to the crisis.
This same logic applies to rating agencies as well. Rating agencies proactively
addressed some of the worst excesses that led to the subprime mortgage crisis.286 By
engaging in a degree of self-regulation and restraint, rating agencies hope to avoid more
invasive regulation and to dampen any reputational fallout from the crisis.287 That is
progress, but progress akin to monopolists engaging in limit pricing, which occurs when
a monopolist charges less than the monopoly price as a way to forestall regulatory
pressure or new entrants by diverting attention away from its monopoly power.288
Similarly, in the wake of the financial crisis rating agencies have the incentive to
scrutinize new offerings more closely and to downgrade more proactively. But these
self-preservation steps do not change the leading rating agencies’ underlying incentives
to largely maintain the status quo in which ratings are deferential to issuers and slow to
change.
The federal government may also lack the incentive to sustain a system of
accurate and timely ratings, which casts doubt on relying primarily on a regulated
industry approach. The concern is that, if rating agencies were truly timely and accurate,
they may expose how deep a hole the federal government and broader economy is in.
The controversy about the downgrade of the credit rating of the United States
282
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underscores the paradox the government faces. Standard & Poor’s took the lead in taking
reformers at their word that they wanted timely downgrades by issuing a downgrade of
the United States itself, and each of the other rating agencies signaled that the United
States was under scrutiny.289 This downgrade in itself was more of a reputational shock
than a financial one, but it signaled the ability of the rating agencies to push back.290 The
federal government’s debt financing challenges will only loom larger in the future,291
which may dampen the political impetus for rating agency accountability.
SEC regulators also indirectly experience the political headwinds against timely
and accurate ratings. Regulators may want to appear to heighten rating agency
accountability, but also fear the self-fulfilling prophecy potential for lower ratings to lead
to ratings downgrades. Greater accuracy of ratings may reveal the weaknesses of the
financial system that the SEC oversees and ultimately exacerbate other problems that are
papered over by generous ratings.
That leaves investors as the strongest potential constituency for accurate and
timely ratings. But there is a danger of overstating the degree of their commitment to
holding rating agencies accountable. Investors have a clear interest in rating accuracy at
the time they purchase a security, because it provides a proxy of credit risk as well as
insulates money managers from criticism if the investment goes awry.292 Systematically
lower ratings would enhance credit quality and value for investors. But investors’
interest in timely upgrades or downgrades is not as clear once they own the security,
because rapid increases or decreases in ratings, however timely, would disrupt their
business.293
In fact, sophisticated investors may have little interest even in accurate ratings ex
ante. Perpetuating a system of inflated ratings may allow institutional investors to
leverage their informational advantages over the broader market. Institutional investors’
internal research may put them in a better position to cherry pick higher quality assets
with the same ratings as lower quality assets.294 This point is particularly problematic
when considering that institutional investors are presumed to be the actors with the
greatest ability and incentive to monitor rating agencies.295
In spite of this concern, investors, including institutional investors, have the
strongest interest among these stakeholders in increasing the degree of accuracy and
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timeliness of ratings. They may bring their own conflicts of interest to the table (though
to a lesser degree than other actors), but investors serve as the one plausible tool to
increase private oversight and accountability of rating agencies. The fact that investors’
interests are fractured may actually empower them to be more effective monitors,
because some investors at any given time will have a strong interest in monitoring
ratings. Regulators cannot and should not “go it alone” in leading the overhaul of rating
agencies. There is a need to bring investors more actively into the process of creating
sustainable means for overseeing rating agencies, fostering competition, and enhancing
ratings’ accuracy.
The abandonment of expert liability exposure for rating agencies means that the
primary recourse for private enforcement is through Rule 10b-5 actions. For this reason
it is worthwhile to consider the potential for expanding private oversight tools more
broadly. A combination of capped damages and a gross negligence standard for rating
agency liability exposure could provide a balanced way to incentivize private policing of
a broader spectrum of rating agency misconduct, while keeping both rating agency duties
and potential sanctions manageable.
The reluctance to expand the scope of private monitoring and enforcement likely
rests on the concern of exposing rating agencies to potentially ruinous liability, even in
the case of a single breach.296 Rating agencies lack the means to make investors whole
for their reliance on erroneous ratings.297 Rating fees are nominal compared to the dollar
amount of debt issues they assess. For this reason imposing full liability for investors’
losses would pose significant risks of over-deterrence, because rating agencies only
receive a small amount of the rewards that issuers receive from a deceptive rating.298
Exposing rating agencies to modest sanctions in private suits could have
substantial incentive effects, yet not over-deter. Policymakers could mitigate liability
concerns by capping the liability exposure of rating agencies to a multiple of their annual
fees for any given security. This way a single suit or series of suits would not raise the
risk of bankrupting rating agencies. Rating agencies could be required to carry insurance
or to meet self-insurance requirements of capital reserves to guard against this risk.299
This requirement could be linked to NRSRO certification, so that investors would know
that rating agencies face a degree of liability if it turns out that ratings were deceptive.
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This approach would balance incentives for greater private monitoring and
enforcement with a limited financial deterrent for rating agencies.300 A system of caps on
liability exposure could also allow for the imposition of a higher multiple of annual fees
in the case of repeated or willful breaches of duty, creating a bounded punitive damage
exception consistent with a deterrence strategy. Caps on liability exposure would also
facilitate the ability of rating agencies to secure insurance coverage for their potential
liability. While this approach would require the creation of a new insurance niche,
insurance markets cover an ever-increasing set of risks, and the cap approach would
make rating agency exposure a more measurable risk.301 Alternatively, rating agencies
could bypass the need for formal insurance if their capital levels and diversification of
risks are high enough that they are effectively self-insured.302 This approach would raise
costs for rating agencies, but likely not in a way that would risk driving them out of the
market.
The use of capped damages would allow policymakers to enlist the plaintiff’s bar
to police a broader range of rating agency conduct. For example, both the original House
Dodd-Frank bill and recent European Union legislation called for the imposition of gross
negligence liability on rating agencies.303 The virtue of this approach is that it is very
difficult to prove outright fraud by rating agencies, and policing of fraud only covers a
small subset of rating agency misconduct.304 Rating agencies have specialized skills and
employ methods and ratings that incorporate a degree of ambiguity.305 This fact may
allow rating agencies to obfuscate the degree of issuer risk exposure, increasing the
difficulty of delineating a clear standard of conduct or accuracy.306 Short of a smoking
gun of complicity or an absence of due diligence, it will be difficult to show the required
rating agency recklessness to establish outright fraud.
Instead, the larger enforcement concern is the degree of rating agency negligence,
which can undermine the reliability of ratings. The nature of rating agencies’ screening
role is that their wrongdoing will be subtle and instead fall within or near the boundaries
of negligent or grossly negligent conduct, i.e., a gross deviation from reasonable
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standards of care.307 The adoption of negligence-based liability could open the
floodgates to litigation about the contours of reasonable care in the ratings context. But
the lighter touch of applying a gross negligence approach may offer a better balance of
incentives for gatekeeper compliance and private monitoring. There may be concerns
that rating agencies may still be overly cautious if they face significant uncertainty
concerning what constitutes compliance with a gross negligence standard.308 But having
rating agencies err on the side of defensible ratings and additional diligence is not a bad
problem to have given rating agencies’ recent failures. Caps on liability may dampen
incentives for private monitoring and suits. However, coupling limited liability exposure
with a gross negligence standard would provide incentives for a balance of greater
oversight and plausible liability burdens.
V. Conclusion
Reforms have addressed the most egregious shortcomings of rating agencies that
fueled the financial crisis. But in many ways the process of reform is still in its inception
phase. The most important challenges of how to foster competition and enhance rating
agency accuracy and accountability remain open questions. Part of the problem is DoddFrank’s conflicting strategies that simultaneously promise to marginalize rating agencies,
to expose rating agencies to disclosure requirements and private suits, and to entrench
rating agencies as a regulated industry. Pursuing all of these objectives at once has been
counter-productive and has made the SEC’s already daunting task of rating agency
oversight all the more unmanageable.
The crucial challenge facing policymakers is designing a replacement for the
issuer-pays system. Policymakers face significant dilemmas in crafting benchmarks for
rating agency performance. Tying the selection or compensation of rating agencies to
meeting benchmarks could potentially undermine the goals of greater competition by
accentuating herding effects and the tailoring of ratings to meet the benchmark. Given
the challenges of establishing performance-based standards, policymakers should
consider alternative ways to enhance competition such as by using regulatory incentives
to break up the leading rating agencies to create a larger pool of credible rating agencies.
Additionally, policymakers should consider expanding the scope of private enforcement
opportunities to leverage the self-interest of investors to monitor and prosecute grossly
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negligent conduct by rating agencies. This approach would enhance efforts to foster
greater competition and accountability and would complement the SEC’s ongoing efforts
to overhaul the rating agency industry.
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